REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES AND SOCIO-STRUCTURAL CONFLICT IN POSTINDUSTRIAL EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

David Attewell: Redistribution Attitudes and Socio-Structural Conflict in Postindustrial Europe
(Under the direction of Gary Marks)

A growing vein of scholarship argues that redistribution attitudes are rooted not only in economic self-interest, but also in perceptions about the deservingness of those receiving help, an arena in which social affinity and status judgments loom large (Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). This dissertation applies recent theoretical and methodological advances to reexamine redistributive conflict and its consequences for the social bases of partisan divides in Europe.

The first paper offers a new perspective on the ideological underpinnings of voting behavior in Europe. In varying degrees and combinations, I find preferences about the scope of the welfare state and perceptions of the deservingness of benefit recipients predict vote choice not only for longstanding parties, but also for green and radical right parties traditionally associated with the rising salience of socio-cultural issues. The second paper examines how deservingness perceptions and welfare state support relate to the education cleavage in electoral politics. Political economy perspectives of education as a labor market asset imply different effects on redistributive preferences than sociological and psychological views of education as a source of status (in)security associated with the propensity to draw or reject harsh boundaries against benefit recipients. Mediation analyses suggest the negative (positive) deservingness perceptions of those with low (high) education help to explain why radical right and green voters represent the poles of

the education cleavage. Finally, a third (co-authored) paper offers fresh evidence about the nature of the gender gap in redistribution attitudes. Our results suggest women are more supportive of an expansive welfare state than men, but do not perceive the needy as more deserving. This implies that the gender gap is not the result of differences in empathy produced by gendered socialization. However, differences in welfare state support cannot be attributed to simple self-interest either. The gender gap emerges and widens only at the middle and higher ends of the economic distribution, where affluent men's attitudes towards the welfare state become sharply more negative, relative to their female counterparts.

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INTRODUCTION

The landscape of "frozen" cleavages of class and religion described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) has changed dramatically. The dense associational networks that tied much of the organized working class to socialist parties or Catholics to Christian Democratic parties have declined in the face of decades of heightened mobility, both of people and capital. In recent years, parties of the center-left and center-right, dominant for much of the 20th century, have weakened or even collapsed as new challenger parties have emerged (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; de Vries & Hobolt 2020; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos 2020).

Yet despite these dramatic changes, politics today nevertheless remain sharply defined by conflict between structurally-rooted social groups (Langsæther & Stubager 2019; Bornschier et al. 2021). Recent elections from across the developed world reveal stark political divides between people with high and low education, production workers and managers, and men and women. Yet these groups are in motion. University graduates, who in the early postwar period would once have been reliable conservatives, now form an increasingly central constituency of parties of the left. Meanwhile, many less-educated blue-collar workers have fled social democratic and radical left parties for parties of the far right, particularly those not organized in trade unions (Houtman et al. 2008; Piketty 2018; Mosimann et al. 2019).

The rise of new conflicts over immigration and supranational identity are certainly a key part of the story (Kriesi et al. 2008; Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2018). Yet rising inequality, economic crises, and the emergence of new social risks mean that redistributive conflicts remain highly salient. The politics of redistribution are rooted both in

economic self-interest and in beliefs about the deservingness of those receiving help, an arena in which status judgments and social solidarities loom large (Van Oorschot 2006; Cavaillé 2014; Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). Theoretical frameworks which distinguish between self-oriented and other-oriented redistribution attitudes offer a more fine-grained lens with which to understand and interpret changes in the socio-structural and ideological bases of political behavior in Europe.

The first paper examines the relationship between preferences about the scope of the welfare state, perceptions of the deservingness of benefit recipients, and voting behavior. I find that the effects of one or both of these subdimensions of redistribution attitudes are strongly associated with vote choice. This is true not only for the longstanding parties that historically built and competed over the shape of European welfare states, but also for green and radical right parties traditionally associated in the literature with the rising salience of socio-cultural issues.

The second paper examines how deservingness perceptions and welfare state support relate to the education cleavage in electoral politics. A political economy perspective which defines education as a labor market asset implies different effects on redistributive preferences from sociological and psychological conceptions of education, which see education as a source of status (in)security associated with the propensity to draw or reject harsh boundaries against benefit recipients. Both views find empirical support: education is negatively associated with support for an expansive welfare state, but positively associated with perceptions of the needy as deserving. Further mediation analyses suggest the negative (positive) deservingness perceptions of those with low (high) education help to explain why radical right and green voters represent the poles of the education cleavage.

Finally, a third paper (co-authored with Andreas Jozwiak and Kaitlin Alper) uses this multidimensional framework to offer fresh evidence about the nature of the gender gap in redistribution attitudes. Our results suggest women are more supportive of an expansive welfare state than men, but do not perceive the needy as more deserving. This implies that the gender gap is not the result of differences in empathy produced by gendered socialization. However, differences in welfare state support cannot be attributed to simple self-interest either. The gender gap only emerges and widens at the middle and higher ends of the economic distribution, where affluent men's attitudes towards the welfare state are on average more negative, relative to their female counterparts.

CHAPTER 1: DESERVINGNESS PERCEPTIONS, WELFARE STATE SUPPORT, AND VOTE CHOICE IN WESTERN EUROPE[1]

Introduction

Scholars have argued that the rising vote share of green and radical right[2] parties and the weakening of longstanding party families in Europe indicate the declining relevance of attitudes on the economic dimension for voters and the rising importance of immigration, supranational integration, and post-materialist values for vote choice (Bornschier 2009; De Vries 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Inglehart 1977; Kriesi 1998). These latter issues form a socio-cultural dimension seen by most researchers as orthogonal to the older economic left/right.[3] Green and radical right parties, competitors on the so-called "transnational cleavage", emphasize their distinctive and extreme positions on immigration and the EU, while having indistinct or moderate positions on the redistributive dimension (Rovny 2012; Rovny 2013; Hooghe & Marks

[1] This is the authors accepted manuscript of an article published as the version of record in West European Politics© 11 February 2020 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1715704. This article has benefited from comments from many colleagues to whom I express my deepest gratitude. First, thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Rahsaan Maxwell, Marc Hetherington, Jan Rovny, Leah Christiani, Andreas Jozwiak, Lucy Britt, Eroll Kuhn, Ted Enamorado and Kaitlin Alper for their valuable suggestions. Second, thanks to the participants of the May 3–4 2019 Partisan Divides Workshop at UNC Chapel Hill, and particularly Sara Hobolt in her capacity as discussant, for their helpful comments. Finally, I thank two anonymous reviewers and editors of *West European Politics* for their thoughtful and constructive input throughout the review process.

[2] Scholars have used several different labels to describe this party family, including populist right, far right, and Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (see Golder 2016, 481-82). I use the term radical right because it is the most commonly used in the field.

[3] The division in values between opponents and supporters of transnationalism is expressed in a new dimension of political conflict which scholars use different labels to capture, but which are conceptually similar: post-materialism (Inglehart 1977**)**, cosmopolitanism vs. parochialism (De Vries 2018), particularism vs. universalism (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), libertarianism vs. authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1988), the group dimension (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014), demarcation vs. integration (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008) or Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) vs. Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).

2018; Rovny and Polk 2020). Mainstream parties defined by older class and religious cleavages, meanwhile, display the opposite pattern (Hooghe & Marks 2018).

This paper argues, on the contrary, that voters remain strongly motivated by redistributive conflict, including those who support radical right and green parties. This diverges from arguments that green and radical right voters are defined by their attitudes on the "non-economic" dimension (e.g. Flanagan & Lee 2003; Inglehart & Norris 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2009). This is not to say that economic and socio-cultural conflicts are entirely separate. Indeed, this paper argues that moral judgments of the needy are a crucial aspect of political conflict over redistribution. However, thinking of deservingness as part of an economic dimension highlights that these "other-oriented" redistribution attitudes are not reducible to attitudes towards immigrants or supranational authority which conventionally characterize the socio-cultural dimension.

This paper builds on Cavaillé & Trump (2015) in arguing that attitudes towards redistribution can be broken into two distinct subdimensions. The first concerns support for the welfare state and inequality reduction. The second concerns perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries. These are not the same; indeed, voters can and sometimes do support an expansive welfare state while having a dim view of the deservingness of benefit recipients and vice versa.[4] Applying this two-dimensional framework of redistribution attitudes to a cross-national analysis of vote choice, I demonstrate that, in combination, attitudes on each of these

[4] In a particularly illustrative example, Bullock (1999) finds that poor American benefit recipients were themselves more likely than middle class respondents to support the claim that welfare recipients are lazy or dishonest, while opposing cuts to welfare and maintaining that welfare programs themselves were socially legitimate. Middle class recipients, meanwhile, were less likely to make negative character judgements about the poor but more likely to support cuts and reject the legitimacy of welfare programs in the first place.

subdimensions predict vote choice for different party families. To my knowledge, this is the first application of said framework to explaining vote choice in a cross-national context.

Using 2016 European Social Survey data for 15 Western European countries, I find that voting for green and radical right parties is strongly influenced by the perceived deservingness of benefit recipients. Those who see recipients as undeserving are substantially more likely to vote for radical right parties, while the opposite is true for those voting for green parties. This effect holds *even controlling for voters' positions on other issues like immigration and European integration*, traditionally identified in the literature as central issues for their electorates. Support or opposition to an expansive welfare state, however, is not statistically significantly related to the probability of voting for either party.

Voters for radical left and social democratic parties are more likely to favor a more expansive welfare state and stronger state action to reduce inequality, while liberal and conservative voters are more likely to support a smaller state and be more tolerant of inequality. For these established party families, positions on the welfare state and inequality and perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries both predict the probability of voting for the party in similar ways.

Rather than being eclipsed by other conflicts or salient only to a shrinking subset of voters, redistribution remains relevant for vote choice for both emerging and established party families. This multi-dimensional analysis suggests that the contemporary landscape is one in which voters' choices of particular party families are associated with different combinations of attitudes about the welfare state and attitudes about the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries.

Unpacking the economic left/right

Though different in important respects, literature in both the realignment and neo-cleavage traditions emphasizes that the rise of radical right and green parties is rooted primarily in their appeals on socio-cultural issues, rather than the issues of redistribution that distinguish older party families of the left and right (Bornschier 2010; De Vries 2018; Dolezal 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2009).

However, many scholars have drawn attention to the rising political resonance of *welfare chauvinism*: support for a stronger welfare state, but with benefits and services restricted to natives rather than immigrants (Emmeneger and Klemmensen 2013; Magni 2018a; Magni 2020; Mews and Mau 2014; Van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman 2010). Welfare chauvinism implies a blending of economic and cultural issues, as individuals' positions on the welfare state are filtered through their perceptions of immigrants as potential competitors for resources.

Beyond purely ethnic motivations, a different approach argues that 'other-oriented' considerations centered around social affinity with recipients or negative character judgments of perceived 'freeloaders' also shape attitudes towards redistribution (Achterberg, Houtman, & Derks 2011; Achterberg, Van Der Veen & Raven 2013; Bloemraad et al. 2019; Cavaillé 2014; Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Houtman, Achterberg & Derks 2008; Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 64-68).[5] These affinities are not limited to immigration status or race, but also imply divisions rooted in class, education, social status, and geography.

In evaluating contemporary redistributive attitudes, then, there are conceptual and empirical drawbacks to adopting a unidimensional view (Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Roosma, Gelissen & Van Oorschot 2013).

[5] Still other contributions in the literature on "other-oriented" motives for redistributive attitudes present a model of parochial altruism compatible both with theories rooted in welfare chauvinism or in other forms of status competition (Shayo 2009; Lupu & Pontusson 2011).

Cavaillé & Trump's (2015) compelling theoretical framework divides attitudes towards redistribution into two different subdimensions. Attitudes about the deservingness of benefit recipients and those about the scope of the welfare state[6] cluster distinctly from one another, and individuals evaluate them using different psychological mechanisms.

Deservingness refers to perceptions that welfare state beneficiaries are or are not worthy of receiving public support and, relatedly, about whether or not receiving welfare state benefits and services undermine recipients' sense of personal and social responsibility. In forming deservingness judgments, citizens consider the extent to which they identify and empathize with those receiving help (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 148).

This paper conceives of deservingness as a *general orientation towards the needy*, rather than a relative ranking of different recipient groups. An exhaustive literature finds that individuals across welfare states perceive a similar hierarchy of deservingness between different groups of beneficiaries, with the elderly being the most deserving, followed by the sick/disabled, with the unemployed, and immigrants in particular seen as the least deserving (e.g. Van Oorschot 2006; Petersen et al. 2011; Petersen 2012; Petersen 2015; Jensen & Petersen 2017).[7] However, if respondents perceive a similar *rank order* of different groups receiving benefits in terms of

[6] Cavaillé (2014) and Cavaillé & Trump (2015) refer to these two dimensions of redistribution attitudes as "Redistribution To (the poor)" and "Redistribution From (the rich)," respectively.

[7] More specifically, scholars have found that perceptions of the work ethic of recipients and the degree of control they have over their economic circumstances have an important effect on people's evaluations of their deservingness (Feather, 1999; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Magni, 2018b). Research by political psychologists argues that deservingness perceptions result from a pre-political, automatic heuristic which motivates individuals to help the genuinely needy within their in-group while harshly punishing free riders, a tendency with roots in evolutionary psychology (Petersen et al., 2011; Petersen, 2012; Petersen, 2015; Jensen & Petersen, 2017).

deservingness, differences in the *level* of deservingness they ascribe to welfare state beneficiaries in general may be more relevant for voters' choices between different party families.[8]

In contrast with deservingness attitudes, the materialist literature suggests that attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state tend to evoke calculations of self-interest, as citizens consider whether they would be likely to benefit or lose out from welfare state programs and attempts to redistribute income (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Meltzer and Richards 1981; Romer 1975). Specifically, those with higher income and greater labor market security tend to resist the expansion of the welfare state and redistributive taxation, while those with lower incomes and greater economic risk tend to support it (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009; Rehm 2011; Cavaillé and Trump 2015: 148).

If deservingness perceptions and welfare state support are separate and distinct subdimensions of economic attitudes, it follows that they may shape voting behavior in different ways across the party political landscape. Some parties may attract voters that are highly negative on one subdimension, but more positive on another, and vice versa, while other parties' electorates may have congruent views on both subdimensions. This raises the question: what is the relationship between voters' deservingness perceptions and welfare state support and their vote choice for different party families?

Deservingness perceptions and welfare state support for radical right and green voters

Perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries hinge on mechanisms of social affinity and empathy that we might expect to speak particularly strongly to radical right and green voters, for several reasons. First, voters for both party families tend to stand at

[8] For a similar approach geared towards explaining perceptions of welfare beneficiaries generally rather than the relative merit of different groups, see Roosma et al. (2015).

opposing poles of a libertarian-authoritarian value divide as a function of their support or opposition to strong social hierarchies and their divergent levels of tolerance for deviance from social norms (Flanagan & Lee 2003; Kitschelt 1994: 10; Stubager 2010: 58). The authoritarian-libertarian dimension is usually associated in the literature with the socio-cultural, rather than the economic divide.[9]

However, views of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries reflect attitudes towards both social hierarchy and social deviance. On the one hand, the act of demarcating deserving from undeserving poor inherently constructs a hierarchy of social legitimacy between groups (Van Oorschot 2006); making or rejecting such a categorization thus in part reflects a person's comfort with social hierarchy. On the other hand, those labeled as the undeserving poor are by definition perceived as socially deviant since they have failed to uphold norms of personal responsibility (Achterberg et al. 2013: 217). Radical right parties in particular have bombarded their voters with images of 'welfare scroungers,' which likely sharpen perceptions of the needy as both undeserving and deviant (Andersen 1992). .

A second dynamic which could divide green and radical right voters particularly sharply in terms of their deservingness perceptions is their membership in distinct socio-structural and status groups. Researchers have found that green voters are disproportionately highly educated, urban, and middle class socio-cultural professionals (Dolezal 2010). Radical right voters, on the other hand, are disproportionately lower-educated, suburban or rural residents (Oesch & Rennwald 2018; Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rydgren 2013). Iversen & Soskice (2019) emphasize the spatial dimension of this divide. They argue that, in order to function as engines of postindustrial economic growth, cities require concentrations of highly educated professionals, and the public

[9] Houtman et al. (2008) is an important exception in its linking of working class authoritarianism to both strong preferences for conditionality and populist right voting.

investment and cultural diversity required to attract them. Disproportionately working class, low education residents of rural or suburban areas, meanwhile, oppose urban-concentrated public spending and see diversity as a source of competition for welfare state resources (Iversen and Soskice 2019: 52).

These groups differ markedly not only in their objective social characteristics but also in their levels of subjective social status. Social status is a positional good; in other words, status-conscious individuals care about whether they have more or less status than others. Crucially, people tend to be *last-place averse* (Cavaillé 2014; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Kuziemko et al. 2014). The status insecure are thus particularly concerned with policing social boundaries to distance and distinguish themselves from those at the very bottom of status hierarchies, a finding reflected in quantitative and ethnographic research in both the United States and Europe (Cramer 2016; Fiske 2011; Hochschild 2016; Jost & Banaji 1994; Lamont 2000; Tajfel & Turner 1986). In this vein, Gidron & Hall (2017) find that low subjective social status is associated with voting for radical right parties. By contrast, the relatively high social status of green voters may protect them from the need to demarcate themselves from the poor and thus make them more likely to attribute neediness to structural factors rather than individual failings.

In summary, I hypothesize that more positive perceptions of the *deservingness* of welfare state beneficiaries are on average associated with support for green parties and negatively associated with support for radical right parties (H1).

H1: perceptions of deservingness are positively associated with support for green parties and negatively associated with support for radical right parties.

For parties arrayed on the transnational cleavage, traditional issues of contestation over the welfare state are generally secondary in terms of salience. Since green and radical right parties seek to attract voters from both left and right party constituencies, they present ambiguous or centrist positions on issues of redistribution (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Koedam 2018; Rovny 2013; Rovny & Polk 2020). Voters' positions on the economic left/right, operationalized in past research by questions about inequality and the scope of the welfare state, have thus not been found predictive of voting for green or radical right parties (Dolezal 2010; Rovny & Polk 2020: 14). I thus predict that support for the welfare state will not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of voting for green or radial right (H2) parties.

H2: support for the welfare state is not related to the probability of voting for green or radical right parties.

Deservingness perceptions and welfare state support for classic party family voters

Deservingness perceptions may be particularly powerful for green and radical right voters, but they should also be relevant for voters for parties along the classic economic left/right cleavage. Discourses about deserving and undeserving recipients have always been a central aspect of welfare state politics (Van Oorschot 2006: 23). Historically, parties of the left on the traditional class cleavage have tended to attribute poverty and recourse to social benefits to structural inequity, while parties on the right of that divide have tended to associate them with individual failings. I thus expect positive perceptions of benefit recipients' deservingness to be associated with a higher probability of voting for social democratic and radical left parties and a lower probability of voting for conservative and liberal parties (H3).

H3: perceptions of deservingness are positively associated with support for social democratic and radical left parties and negatively associated with support for conservative and liberal parties.

Parties of the economic left have historically supported an expanded role for the welfare state while the converse is true for parties on the right of the classic class and religious cleavages (Korpi 1983; Allan & Scruggs 2004). I thus expect that support for the welfare state is on average positively associated with the probability of voting for center left and radical left parties, and negatively associated with the probability of voting for conservative and liberal parties (H4).

H4: support for the welfare state is positively associated with support for social democratic and radical left parties and negatively associated with support for conservative and liberal parties.

Data

The 2016 European Social Survey is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses, as it includes a battery of questions specifically looking at redistributive preferences and vote choice across a range of countries. In particular, I analyze 15 Western European countries[10] from the dataset in order to examine the relationship between deservingness perceptions, welfare state support, and vote choice.

[10]The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries have different party systems, which means the choice set for voters varies across them. Since I am interested in capturing the relationship between redistribution attitudes and vote choice across a range of party systems, I retain a pooled sample. However, to demonstrate the robustness of my results, Appendix 1.3 contains an analysis of a restricted sample of ten countries with the exact same constellation of party families. The results are substantively unchanged.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is vote choice by party family. The party families are *radical left, social democratic, green, liberal, conservative,*[11] and *radical right*. Parties are coded using a combination of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), ParlGov Database (Döring and Manow 2019), and the author's own judgment. A full list of party family codings can be found in Appendix 1.1.

Key independent variables: attitudes towards deservingness and the welfare state

My key independent variables measure attitudes towards redistribution. I use principle component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to analyze the structure of redistribution attitudes. I retain the two most coherent components I call *Deservingness*[12] and *Welfare State,* corresponding to Cavaillé and Trump's (2015) 'Redistribution To' and 'Redistribution From', respectively. *Deservingness* (eigenvalue=2.88) explains approximately 29% of the variance in attitudes towards redistribution, while *welfare state* (eigenvalue=1.82) explains about 18% of the variance. Full factor loadings can be found in Table 1, below. For ease of comparison, both variables are standardized.

[11] Since the paper must present a series of statistical analyses of the effects of two different attitudinal subdimensions across many different party families, I combine Christian Democratic and Conservative parties into one category for parsimony's sake. This also allows for greater comparability across countries, since some countries may have only a conservative party or a Christian democratic party, but not both.

[12] Other survey research operationalizes the concept of deservingness with reference to perceptions of specific groups, rather than as a general orientation. Such research employs questions asking if specific groups deserve more or less money from the welfare state than they currently receive (Jeene et al., 2014), if respondents are concerned about the living standards of a group (Van Oorschot, 2006), about their relative concern for each group in relation to others (Ibid), or directly if groups are deserving of state financial assistance or not (Van Oorschot, 2000; Jensen and Petersen, 2017). The factor analysis approach used here has several benefits. Methodologically, combining multiple measures reduces the measurement error associated with using single survey items to capture attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. 2008). This approach also accounts for the fact that *deservingness* is a multi-faceted concept which may be hard to fully capture with a single measure. Substantively, the choice to measure deservingness as a general orientation towards the needy rather than a relative evaluation of individual groups is more appropriate for highlighting variation across different party family electorates.

Table 1: Rotated Factor Loadings

Variable	Deservingness	Welfare State
Many manage to obtain benefit they are not entitled to	**.419**	-.126
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people lazy	**.526**	.054
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people less willing to care for each other	**.504**	.002
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job	**.494**	-.014
Government should reduce differences in income levels	-.017	**.413**
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts	.113	**.312**
For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small	.036	**.376**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the elderly	-.087	**.479**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed	.151	**.409**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents	-.075	**.419**

(Strongest loadings in bold)

Questions that load most strongly onto the *deservingness* component ask respondents to make judgments about those who receive social benefits and services and the effects of government assistance on recipients' sense of personal and social responsibility. Answers to these questions should reflect respondents' social affinity with and empathy for benefit recipients. Higher values of *deservingness* indicate more positive views towards benefit recipients.

Questions that load most strongly onto the *welfare state* component concern attitudes towards inequality and the scope of government responsibility in social policy. Instead of eliciting a character judgment of or an evaluation of social affinity with some other recipient, questions of government responsibility should provoke a calculation of self-interest, in which

respondents ask themselves whether they themselves would benefit or not from redistribution. Higher values of *welfare state* indicate support for government responsibility for providing social services and reducing inequality.

It is important to test whether the relationship between *deservingness* perceptions and vote choice is a spurious one driven by support or opposition to immigration. Therefore, another substantively vital independent variable in my analyses is *immigration attitudes,* measured by a question asking respondents on a 0-10 scale whether they think immigrants make their country a worse (0) or better place to live (10).

Controls

My models include a series of controls. The first is *income,* measured by respondents' self-reported household income decile. The second is *education,* an ordinal variable measuring highest degree attainment. *Subjective economic insecurity* is a binary variable in which respondents who feel either A: very or somewhat worried about losing their job or B: that it is very or somewhat difficult living on their current income receive a score of 1, and 0 otherwise. *Occupational class* is a measure using Oesch's 8-class typology (see: Oesch 2006). *Age* is the respondent's age in years. *Urban* is an ordinal variable measuring whether respondents are from a rural area, a small town, a suburb, or a big city). *Union* is a binary variable with current or past union members coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. *Female* is a dummy variable. Finally, *Attend Services* is an ordinal measure of religiosity asking respondents whether they attend religious services never or almost never, rarely, or at least once a week. Space limitations preclude a discussion of the effects of these controls on vote choice, but full results can be found in Appendix 1.2.

Distinguishing party family electorates by deservingness perceptions and welfare state support

Figure 1 displays the mean *deservingness* (Y axis) and *welfare state* attitudes (X axis) for the voters of each party family. On average, green and radical left voters have the most positive *deservingness* perceptions, followed by social democratic and liberal voters, while conservative and (to an even greater extent) radical right voters have the most negative *deservingness* perceptions. On the *welfare state* subdimension, radical left voters are on average the most supportive, while conservative and liberal voters are the most opposed. Green and social democratic voters are on average moderately positive on *welfare state*, while radical right voters are moderately negative.

Figure 1: Mean *Deservingness* and *Welfare state* By Party Family



Moving beyond descriptive analysis, multinomial logistic regression allows us to measure whether and how deservingness perceptions and welfare state support affect voting for different party families under statistical controls. These models are long and unwieldy, so I limit my

discussion to the effects of *deservingness* and *welfare state* support on vote choice and report the full results with controls in Appendix 1.2. Multinomial logistic regression requires that a base outcome be omitted for comparison; I choose conservative parties for this purpose. Coefficients can thus be interpreted as the effect of *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support on voting for a given party family, relative to voting for a conservative party (and under all the controls described above).

Results

Table 2 below displays multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the effects of *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support on vote choice. As we can see, both have effects on vote choice, however, the pattern of their associations varies across party families. In keeping with expectations in H3 and H4 respectively, positive perceptions of benefit recipients' *deservingness* and *welfare state* support distinguish radical left and social democratic voters from conservative voters, on average. In keeping with H1, positive perceptions of *deservingness* have the strongest association with voting green, relative to voting conservative. Contrary to H2, support for the welfare state is also strongly associated with green support on average, although the relationship is weaker than that for *deservingness*. Liberal voters are not significantly different from conservative voters on either subdimension. However, given the similar positions of liberal and conservative parties on the *welfare state* subdimension, this model is unable to test H3 or H4, a problem imposed by the necessity of omitting a base category for comparison.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is the contrast between radical right and conservative voters. Negative perceptions of *deservingness* are on average statistically significantly associated with support for radical right parties, even relative to conservative parties. However radical right

voters are also statistically significantly more *positive* towards the *welfare state* than conservative voters.

Table 2: Effect of Deservingness Perceptions & Welfare State Support on Party Family Vote

	Deservingness	**Welfare State**
Conservative (base outcome)	N/A	N/A
Social Democrat	**.37*** ** (.03)	**.47*****(.09)
Radical Left	**.67*****(.04)	**.72*****(.07)
Liberal	.17(.12)	.08(.11)
Green	**.75*** ** (.08)	**.38*** ** (.08)
Radical Right	**-.26*** ** (.07)	**.33*** ** (.08)

N= 12,105. R^2 =.19. For complete results with controls, see Appendix 2a.

To interpret the relative magnitude of effects of *deservingness* and *welfare state* on vote choice, predicted probabilities derived from the multinomial logistic regression model are more useful than regression coefficients. All figures below report the probability of voting for a given party family across the range of both *deservingness* and *welfare state* values, holding all controls at their means. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2 reports the predicted probability of voting for parties on the transnational cleavage across the range of *deservingness* and *welfare state* values, under controls. *Deservingness* perceptions stand out for their powerful effects on the probability of voting for green and radical right parties. Respondents with the most negative *deservingness* perceptions have slightly less than a 2% chance of voting green, while those with the most positive perceptions of *deservingness* are over seven times as likely to vote green at around 15%. Conversely, respondents with the most negative *deservingness* perceptions are the most likely to vote for radical right parties at approximately 14%, while those with the highest *deservingness*

perceptions have only an approximately 3% chance of voting for a radical right party. This constitutes strong evidence in favor of H1. This mirror image of the impacts of *deservingness* perceptions for each party suggests a potentially novel attitudinal basis underlying green and radical right voters' opposing positions on either side of the transnational cleavage.

By contrast, variation in *welfare state* support has no statistically significant effect on the probability of voting for either green or radical right parties. The lack of statistically significant effects of *welfare state* support on voting green or radical right also suggests that this subdimension is secondary for both party families. This finding constitutes evidence in support of H2.

Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Voting Green or Radical Right By *Deservingness* and *Welfare state*



Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars represent 95% confidence intervals

Figure 3 reports the predicted probabilities of voting for social democratic or conservative parties, under controls. In contrast to voters for parties along the transnational cleavage, positions on *deservingness* and *welfare state* subdimensions have very similar effects on the probability of voting for these older parties of the left/right cleavage. Respondents with the most negative views of *deservingness* have approximately a 22% chance of voting for social

democrats, while those with the most positive views almost twice as likely to vote social democratic at about 38%. The estimates for the effects of *welfare state* support are strongly similar.

Conversely, respondents with the most negative *deservingness* perceptions have about a 42% chance of voting conservative, which falls to approximately 20% for those with the most positive *deservingness* perceptions. The relationship is similar for *welfare state* support, with respondents with the most negative *welfare state* attitudes most likely to vote conservative at about 45%, falling to only approximately 19% for those with the strongest support for the *welfare state*.

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Voting Social Democratic or Conservative By *Deservingness* and *Welfare State*



Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Turning to our final two party families, Figure 4 reports the effect of *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support on voting for liberal and radical left parties. For liberal parties, the confidence intervals are very large, indicating a high degree of uncertainty about the point estimates of the effects of both subdimensions. There is no statistically significant effect of

deservingness on liberal voting, evidence against H3. There is, however, a statistically significant negative effect of *welfare state* support on voting for liberal parties, evidence in support of H4. The effects of *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support on the probability of voting for the radical left are clearer and highly congruent; at the most negative values of each, the probability of radical left voting is about 3%, but at the highest values rise to around 12%.

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Liberal and Radical Left Voting



Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Robustness check: is deservingness just a proxy for immigration or EU integration attitudes?

One might argue that the deservingness subdimension itself is simply a reflection of immigration attitudes which are central to the socio-cultural dimension. Citizens generally see immigrants as less deserving of public benefits and services than natives (Magni 2020; Van der Waal et al. 2013; Van Oorschot 2006; Van Oorschot & Uunk 2007). In the U.S., with the rising salience of immigration, perceptions of immigrants are now strong predictors of attitudes towards welfare recipients generally (Garand et al. 2017). Perhaps this is why *deservingness* perceptions so powerfully predict support or opposition to parties for whom immigration is a defining issue. However, even if this were to be true, it should be noted that none of the

questions which make up the *deservingness* variable mention immigration or immigrants at all. To the extent that questions about the deservingness of benefit recipients map closely onto support or opposition to immigration, this sheds light on how migrants have become the new face of the "undeserving poor."

Yet we can also go a step further and directly test whether the propensity of those with low and high *deservingness* perceptions to vote for radical right and green parties respectively can be explained by their immigration attitudes. Figure 5 below shows the predicted probability of voting for green or radical right parties according to *deservingness* perceptions, holding all controls at their mean except for immigration attitudes. Radical right and green voters stand out for their particularly negative and positive attitudes towards immigration, respectively. To account for this, I set immigration attitudes to their 10^{th} percentile for the model of radical right voting, and to their 90^{th} percentile for green voting.[13]

Controlling for immigration attitudes has little effect on the relationship between *deservingness* and support for green parties. Controlling for immigration attitudes does weaken the effect of *deservingness* perceptions on the probability of voting radical right. Nonetheless, *deservingness* perceptions continue to have a strong and statistically significant effect on the probability of voting for a radical right party, even after controlling for immigration attitudes. *Deservingness* perceptions, it appears, are related to immigration attitudes but have a strong impact on voting for parties along the transnational cleavage irrespective of them.

[13] For the sake of space, I only display predicted probabilities for radical right and green voters, whose support I expect to be most strongly related to deservingness perceptions.

Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Green and Radical Right Voting, Controlling For Immigration Attitudes



Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Kleider & Stoeckel's (2018) analysis of supranational redistribution attitudes suggests that in the wake of the eurozone crisis and bailouts, distributional conflict has a European as well as a national dimension. Traditionally a defining issue for parties on the transnational cleavage, support for European integration could also potentially confound the relationship between *deservingness* perceptions and the probability of voting green or radical right. As a robustness check, I re-run the multinomial logistic regression predicting vote choice, controlling for respondents' opposition to or support for European integration on a 0-10 scale in addition to previous controls. I again derive predicted probabilities for voting radical right and green across the range of *deservingness* and *welfare state*. I find *deservingness* perceptions are strongly associated with radical right and green voting, even after controlling for both immigration and EU integration attitudes (see Appendix 1.4 for results).

Discussion

There are four main takeaways from these analyses. First, the results suggest that deservingness perceptions are worthy of study as a substantively important predictor of vote

choice, alongside more commonly researched attitudes about the scope of the welfare state. In political conflicts over redistribution, moral judgments of the beneficiaries of the welfare state are as important as disputes over its size and scope. Vote choice on the economic dimension is thus shaped to an important degree by individuals' orientations towards hierarchy and social deviance, previously associated primarily with the socio-cultural dimension.

Second, this paper's findings underline the value of analyzing redistribution attitudes in a multi-dimensional framework. Attitudes on the economic dimension are an important predictor of green and radical right voting. This suggests that these voters are motivated by more than just positions on socio-cultural issues like immigration and European integration. However, this becomes apparent only once the economic dimension has been disaggregated into components of *deservingness* and *welfare state* support. Through this lens, we see that voters for different party families combine attitudes along these two subdimensions in distinct ways. The effects of the two sets of attitudes on vote choice are congruent for mainstream party voters, but not for voters for newer parties competing on the transnational cleavage, who stand out for their polar positions on *deservingness*.

Thirdly, the effects of *deservingness* perceptions on vote choice may help explain changes in the links between socio-structural groups and political parties. This includes the much-studied flight of less-educated working class voters from parties of the left to parties of the radical right (e.g. Harteveld 2016; Houtman et al. 2008; Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Rydgren 2013), as well as the shift of highly educated professionals from liberal and conservative parties to green, left, and center-left parties (Arndt 2014; Beramendi et al 2015; Hausermann et al. 2015; Kitschelt 1994; Oesch & Rennwald 2018; Piketty 2018; Abou-Chadi & Immergut 2019). Most recently, this "New Partisanship" literature has fruitfully used multi-dimensional analyses of

redistribution attitudes in explaining vote choice, focusing in particular on the trade-off between preferences for maintaining social consumption policies demanded by working class voters and social investment policies preferred by the so-called "New Middle Class".

A deservingness/welfare state framework may challenge the strict tradeoff between social consumption and social investment preferences posited by the New Partisanship literature in favor of a voter calculus that mixes economic self-interest and deservingness perceptions. The moral judgments formed by different social classes may sometimes predispose them to support or oppose certain types of social spending in line with their preferences on social consumption vs. social investment, and sometimes may contradict these preferences. For example, in deciding who to vote for, working class voters' disproportionate reliance on unemployment benefits may conflict with their perceptions of welfare abuse by undeserving freeloaders.

Finally, these findings speak to the bounded relevance of immigration for the politics of redistribution. Controlling for immigration attitudes weakens the relationship between *deservingness* perceptions and voting for radical right parties. This suggests that radical right voters' general perceptions of *deservingness* are mediated by their negative attitudes towards immigrants, implying a view of immigrants as undeserving welfare recipients. However, controlling for immigration attitudes has virtually no impact on the relationship between *deservingness* and the predicted probability of voting green. Moreover, the negative association between *deservingness* and radical right voting holds even after controlling for immigration attitudes and support or opposition to EU integration. The opposition of green and radical right voters on deservingness is thus strengthened by the rise of welfare chauvinism, but also appears to be related to a deeper divide potentially rooted in status differences and authoritarian/libertarian values.

This paper argues that deservingness perceptions and welfare state attitudes are substantively important for vote choice in different combinations for voters of different party families. However, the cross-sectional data on which the analysis relies gives a static perspective. Further research should investigate how individuals' positions on these two subdimensions connect to changes in partisanship over time. Furthermore, the scope of this paper was limited to the demand side, but future research should further explore connections between deservingness perceptions, welfare state attitudes, and vote choice on the supply side. In particular, what is the role of exogenous shocks, media coverage and framing, and party strategies in shaping the relationship between voters' attitudes on the two subdimensions and their vote choice? The results of this paper should be interpreted with caution, as the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to tell whether deservingness perceptions and welfare state support are influencing vote choice, or whether support for a certain type of party leads voters to adopt that party's positioning on the two subdimensions. In addressing these questions, longitudinal data combining measures of deservingness perceptions, welfare state support, and vote choice will be vital.

CHAPTER 2: REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES AND VOTE CHOICE ACROSS THE EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE

The Argument in Brief

Education has emerged as an increasingly central social divide in contemporary electoral politics, but its attitudinal underpinnings are disputed. Most researchers have argued that divisions over socio-cultural conflicts around immigration and supranational authority are responsible for the rise of an education cleavage anchored by radical right, green, and liberal parties (Stubager 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Ford and Jennings 2020: 300-302). However, economic inequality along educational lines is as sharp as ever, stoking renewed scholarly interest in the effects of education on attitudes towards redistribution (Mendelberg et al. 2017; Marshall 2019; Bullock 2020; Gelepithis and Giani 2020).

I argue we can more fully understand the education cleavage by integrating recent insights on the measurement of redistribution attitudes, which distinguish between attitudes about the proper scope of the welfare state and perceptions about the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries (Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). Traditional models of political economy view education as a labor market asset and therefore predict that the relatively secure educated oppose redistribution out of self-interest, while the precarious less-educated support it. In contrast, a conception of education as a marker of social status suggests that status-secure university graduates may be less likely than the less-educated to draw harsh boundaries against welfare state beneficiaries as a means to maintain social esteem. These theoretical approaches imply divergent effects of education on two separate subdimensions of

redistribution attitudes: preferences towards the responsibilities of the welfare state and attitudes towards the deservingness of the needy.

Analyses of 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) data from 15 Western European countries demonstrate these contrasting effects. First, the validity of the welfare state and deservingness subdimensions finds support in principal component analyses. Subsequent OLS regression analyses reveal that, on average, higher levels of education are associated with opposition to state responsibility for maintaining decent living standards, but also with perceptions that those receiving help from the welfare state are more deserving. By contrast, low levels of education are associated with the opposite pattern; on average being more favorable towards social provision by government, but also more likely to consider welfare state beneficiaries as shirkers gaming the system.

What implications does this have for the education cleavage in electoral politics? Kappa mediation analyses allow for the decomposition of education effects and estimation of the extent to which these two types of redistribution attitudes explain educational divides in voting. Decomposing the effects of education on vote choice reveals that deservingness perceptions are a particularly important mediator, explaining between a fifth and a quarter of education effects on vote choice for radical right and green parties, whose voters are the most educationally distinctive. The evidence that attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state mediate the effects of education on vote choice is more mixed. However, welfare state support does play a role in explaining education effects on vote choice between proximate party families competing in political space, such as the radical right and conservatives.

This paper makes two main contributions. First, it applies advances in the literature on the multi-dimensionality of redistribution attitudes to analyses of cross-national data in order to

shed light on conflicting evidence about whether education is associated with support or opposition to redistribution. Second, it connects these educational divides in redistribution attitudes to the emergent education cleavage in electoral politics. Less educated voters, who on average see welfare state beneficiaries as undeserving, are disproportionately attracted to the radical right; highly educated voters who on average have the most positive perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to support green parties. This helps to explain why green and radical right voters represent the poles of the educational divide, the attitudinal basis of which is usually understood to be socio-cultural rather than redistributive (Stubager 2010; Dolezal 2010; Hooghe & Marks 2018). In postindustrial economies, divisions between those with high and low education over the welfare state and its beneficiaries are a significant, complementary explanation for the rise of an educational cleavage, alongside conflicts over immigration and transnationalism.

Why It Matters: The Educational Divide in Postindustrial Politics

A prominent vein of scholarship asserts that advanced democracies are undergoing the rise of a new structural cleavage between winners and losers of postindustrial change (Kriesi 1998; Bornschier 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Differences in educational endowments lie at the core of this divide (Stubager 2009; Stubager 2010; Margalit 2012; Häusermann & Kriesi 2015). The well-educated are relatively well-equipped to succeed in competitive internationalized and increasingly skill-intensive labor markets. Those with less education suffer greater insecurity and worry more about the prospect of competition from immigrants, both in the labor market and over welfare state resources. What this educational divide means for the politics of redistribution, however, is unclear.

Despite the link between education and economic security, less-educated working class voters have increasingly moved away from social democratic parties and into "proletarianized" parties of the radical right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1994; Houtman et al. 2008; Rydgren 2013; Harteveld 2016; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). Highly educated professionals, on the other hand, have become a key constituency of left-wing parties in many countries (Häusermann *et al.* 2012: 228; Piketty 2018). Political realignments along educational lines are often attributed to the increasing salience of issues of immigration and supranational integration, which divide those with high and low levels of education (Kriesi *et al.* 2008; Teney *et al.* 2014; Hooghe & Marks 2018: 7-8). However, in an era of rising inequality and precarity, distributional conflict is far from over. Contestation over the welfare state has morphed rather than disappeared, reshaping coalitions in distributive politics (Bonoli & Natali 2012; Häusermann & Geering 2012; Kitschelt & Rehm 2014; Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Beramendi *et al.* 2015).

Unpacking Redistribution: Education Effects in a Multi-Dimensional Context

One of the central themes of recent literature on social policy is that welfare states not only redistribute resources but also insure individuals against risk (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012: 1627). We would thus expect that the risks individuals face in the labor market affect their level of support for redistribution. Particularly in the context of the knowledge economy, researchers have found that education and skills are not only associated with higher income but also with lower risk of unemployment (e.g. Kapstein 2002; Powell & Snellman 2004). As a result of this insurance function of education, research in political economy has found that education reduces individuals' support for redistribution (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Alesina & Giuliano 2011; Rehm 2009; Rehm 2011; Busemeyer 2014; Bullock 2020).

This literature thus makes claims about a negative relationship between education and support for redistribution generally, often tested using a survey item about whether government should reduce differences in income levels. However, recent literature on welfare state preferences in postindustrial societies highlights the drawbacks of a unidimensional understanding and measurement of redistribution, and demonstrates the value of analyzing different dimensions of redistribution attitudes to explain the changing social structure of distributional conflict (e.g. Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Beramendi *et al*. 2015; Garritzmann et al. 2018). So far, this work has focused on the relationship of income and occupational class to different aspects of redistribution preferences.[14] I build on this literature by analyzing how the educational divide that is increasingly reshaping the political landscape relates to two particular subdimensions of redistribution attitudes.

Cavaillé and Trump (2015) demonstrate that there are two distinct subdimensions of redistribution attitudes that prime different psychological mechanisms. Issues of "*redistribution from*" the rich involve questions about the state's responsibility to meet generalized social needs and reduce inequality (Ibid), evoking questions evoke "self-oriented" considerations of individuals' relative economic position and whether they would personally benefit from social programs and efforts to reduce inequality. Since the psychological mechanism triggered is one of self-interest, these issues divide high earners who will bear the brunt of taxes used to finance redistribution from low earners who would be the primary beneficiaries of it (Ibid: 148).

[14] Häusermann & Kriesi's (2015) analyses link attitudes and socio-structural variables including education to vote choice. My contribution focuses on the relationship between education and redistribution attitudes, and the extent to which the relationship between education and vote choice is mediated by these attitudes. Häusermann & Kriesi (2015) also include measures of what they call "welfare misuse", which overlap with the deservingness dimension employed in this paper. However, they subsume these items under a much broader dimension of universalism-particularism, a factor which also includes attitudes about the EU, cultural liberalism, and immigration.

Hypothesis 1 is consistent with the same self-interest based logic as the classic political economy model: because education is an important labor market asset, on average, those with higher levels of educational attainment should oppose a more expansive role for government in providing economic security and reducing inequality (H1).

Hypothesis 1: education is negatively associated with support for the welfare state.

By contrast, issues of "*redistribution to*" the poor or disadvantaged prime mechanisms of social affinity and empathy (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 148). Instead of inward-facing calculations of personal benefit or cost, individuals' views on deservingness reflect a) whether or not they view the needy as worthy of help, and b) whether they view the act of helping recipients as just and unproblematic, or instead view social assistance through the lens of moral hazard.[15]

One might expect the economically secure to blame benefit recipients' situation on individual failings, rather than the unfairness or dysfunction of a social structure within which they live. However, empirical research consistently finds that more affluent people are *less* likely than their poorer counterparts to blame poverty on personal failings. Bullock's (1999: 2076) study of Americans' attitudes towards welfare finds that the poor were more likely to attribute welfare recipients' situation to laziness, relative to middle class respondents. Van Oorschot (2006: 34) similarly notes that "it is often found that those in lower socio-economic positions

[15] This conceptualization is distinct from previous research focused on perceptions of the relative deservingness of particular groups. Scholars have found that recipients' perceived effort and degree of control over their economic fortunes have a significant impact on people's evaluations of their deservingness (Fincham and Jaspers 1980; Feather 1999; Magni 2018b). Van Oorschot (2006) finds that individuals living in different welfare state regimes perceive a similar spectrum of deservingness from the elderly (most deserving), to the sick and disabled, to the unemployed, and finally to immigrants (least deserving). Some researchers argue that deservingness perceptions stem from a pre-political, reflexive heuristic rooted in evolutionary psychology (Petersen *et al.* 2011; Petersen 2012; Petersen 2015; Jensen & Petersen 2017).

have more negative views of, e.g. unemployed people and people on benefit." At the other end of the economic spectrum, Rueda (2017) argues that the wealthy are more sensitive to altruistic concerns than the poor, since their relative security gives them greater latitude to take non-material considerations into account in forming attitudes towards redistribution.

One potential explanation for this counter-intuitive relationship between economic standing and perceptions of the vulnerable lies in how the psychological pressures of status insecurity can sharpen negative evaluations of stigmatized groups (Fiske 2011; Elchardus and Spruyt 2012; Ridgeway 2019). Crucially, when it comes to social status, people tend to be *last-place averse* (Kuziemko *et al.* 2014; Cavaillé 2014). Lower status groups are particularly strongly motivated to defend the status order to maintain their continued separation from stigmatized populations at the very bottom of status hierarchies (Lamont 2000; Gidron & Hall 2017; Gidron & Hall 2020). Indeed, social psychologists have argued that "if low status groups cannot construct a positive social identity, then group members may resort to denigrating outgroups of similar status in an attempt to raise the *relative* status of their in-group by lowering the status of a perceived competitor" (Kuppens *et al.* 2015: 1261).

There is reason to believe these status dynamics are particularly strongly linked to education. The advent of mass higher education has strengthened its social legitimacy as a measure of worth. Despite contemporary increases in inequality, meritocratic narratives present academic attainment as the path for individuals to achieve social mobility in spite of their social backgrounds (Bourdieu 1984). As a result, education is closely associated with an individual's place in contemporary status hierarchies (Fiske 2011; Ridgeway 2019).

As the ranks of the university-educated have increased, the subjective social status of those with lower levels of education has fallen (Spruyt and Kuppens 2015; Gidron and Hall

2017: S74; Gidron and Hall 2020). Often, lower status groups can combat social stigma by forming their own positive in-group identities. However, the less-educated struggle to pursue this strategy. Their low status is socially legitimated, and the absence of educational attainment offers little material with which to build positive group identification (Kuppens *et al.* 2015). Less-educated people might thus instead adopt negative views of welfare beneficiaries' deservingness in an effort to distance themselves from their membership in a low-status group (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Jost & Banaji 1994; Stubager 2009; Fiske 2011: 102-103). The relatively secure social status of the highly educated, meanwhile, obviates the need to stigmatize benefit recipients in order to maintain social esteem. I thus hypothesize that increases in education are also associated with positive perceptions of recipients' deservingness (H2).

Hypothesis 2: education is positively associated with favorable perceptions of benefit recipients' deservingness.

Implications of *Welfare State* and *Deservingness* Attitudes for Education Effects on Vote Choice

Education is increasingly powerful, not only in shaping attitudes and values, but also as a structural divide in contemporary party politics (Hausermänn & Kriesi 2015; Hooghe & Marks 2017; Kriesi *et al.* 2012; Stubager 2010). This perspective suggests that attitudes and values partly mediate the effect of education on voting behavior; structurally-rooted groups in conflict develop distinct attitudes and preferences which are reflected in their vote choice. Mostly, scholars have conceived of the education cleavage as expressing conflicts over socio-cultural issues of immigration and national authority. However, if there are indeed significant differences in *welfare state* support and perceptions of *deservingness* across educational groups, we can

expect them to have implications for voting patterns by education, since there is evidence that these attitudes are themselves a significant predictor of vote choice (Attewell 2021).

In terms of theoretical expectations, then, a political economy perspective on the education cleavage suggests that the relative economic security of the higher-educated should predispose them to vote for liberal and conservative parties which oppose an expansive and egalitarian welfare state (H3a).

Hypothesis 3a: higher educated voters' lower levels of welfare state support mediate the effect of education on voting for liberal and conservative parties.

Conversely, the relatively economically precarious lower-educated should be more likely to vote for radical left and social democratic parties which are supportive of state responsibility for maintaining decent living standards (H3b).

Hypothesis 3b: lower educated voters' higher values of welfare state support mediate the effect of education on voting for radical left and social democratic parties.

A perspective which instead views educational attainment as conferring or diminishing status has different implications. Status insecurity and feelings of relative deprivation are associated with voting for radical right parties (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012; Gidron and Hall 2017; Suryanarayan 2019). Such parties offer scapegoating narratives centered not only on ethnic minorities, but also the unemployed, who they cast as undeserving benefit scroungers (Andersen 1992; de Koster et al. 2012; Afonso and Rennwald 2018). As a result, the status

insecurity of the lower educated should motivate them to vote disproportionately for radical right parties who offer their voters a positive relative comparison with stigmatized welfare state beneficiaries.

Hypothesis 4a: deservingness perceptions mediate the effect of education on voting for radical right parties.

Conversely, the highly educated are not status insecure and lack motivation to draw sharp downwards boundaries against the needy. High levels of education promote discomfort with strict moral hierarchy and denigration of outgroups, and so may be associated with a greater tendency to perceive poverty as due to structural rather than individual failings. Disproportionately high-education green voters have been shown to be ideologically supportive of redistribution, even if their relative affluence renders their material incentives towards redistribution more mixed (Bremer and Schwander 2019; Röth and Schwander 2021)—yet our two-dimensional framework suggests this support will be more strongly applicable to deservingness perceptions than to attitudes about the scope of the welfare state. Their relative status security and more positive perceptions of the needy may thus partly explain the tendency of the highly educated to vote for green parties (Dolezal 2010).

Hypothesis 4b: deservingness perceptions mediate the effect of education on voting for green parties.

Data and Methods

The 2016 ESS is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses because it includes an extensive battery of questions on redistributive preferences and attitudes across a range of countries. In particular, I analyze 15 Western European countries[16] from the dataset in order to examine the relationship between education and attitudes towards redistribution. Below I explain the operationalization of the different variables; full descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 2.1.

Dependent variables: deservingness perceptions and welfare state support

The first set of dependent variables of interest measure attitudes towards redistribution. Previous cross-national research on attitudes towards redistribution often relies on a single question which directly asks respondents about their support or opposition to government redistribution of incomes. This is understandable because most cross-national survey datasets lack multiple questions on attitudes towards redistribution which are consistently repeated over time. However, this operationalization is both theoretically and empirically problematic if attitudes towards redistribution are multi-dimensional (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 146).

I thus use principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to analyze the structure of redistribution attitudes.[17] I again retain the two strongest components I call

[16] Countries included in the analyses are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. I exclude countries which were part of the former Soviet Bloc, since the transition from communism led to sharp discontinuities in their education regimes, which transformed the availability of education and its relationship to labor market outcomes across generations (Kwiek 2014).

[17] See Appendix 2.2 for the full list of survey questions used and more details about the PCA procedure.

deservingness and *welfare state*, corresponding to Cavaillé and Trump (2015)'s "*redistribution to*" and "*redistribution from*", respectively.[18] *Deservingness* explains about 24% of the variance in redistribution attitudes, while *welfare state* explains about 23% of the variance in redistribution attitudes. Both variables are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, so their effects can be more easily compared.

Table 3: Rotated Factor Loadings

Survey Item	Deservingness	Welfare State
Government should reduce differences in income levels	-.020	**.414**
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts	.112	**.315**
For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small	.036	**.376**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the elderly	-.086	**.478**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed	.150	**.407**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents	-.073	**.418**
Many manage to obtain benefits they are not entitled to	**.420**	-.127
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people lazy	**.525**	.057
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people less willing to care for each other	**.503**	.004
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job	**.495**	-.017

(Strongest factor loadings in bold)

[18] This paper uses the conceptual labels of *deservingness* and *welfare state* because they capture general orientations towards welfare state beneficiaries (the unemployed as well as the poor) and the preferences for the scope of government social policy. The survey questions used to construct the dependent variables in this paper overlap with those used to construct the dimensions of "Redistribution To" and "Redistribution From" in Cavaillé (2014) and Cavaille & Trump (2015) from 2008 European Social Survey data, but not all questions from the 2008 survey wave were available in the 2016 ESS.

Questions that load most strongly onto the *deservingness* component ask respondents to make judgments about people who receive social benefits and services and the effects of government assistance on recipients' sense of personal and social responsibility.[19] This theoretical framework suggests these questions should tap respondents' social affinity with benefit recipients. Higher values of *deservingness* indicate more positive views towards benefit recipients.

Questions that load most strongly onto the *welfare state* component concern attitudes towards inequality and the scope of government responsibility in social and economic policy. Questions of government responsibility should provoke a calculation of self-interest, in which respondents ask themselves whether or not they would personally benefit from redistribution. Higher values on *welfare state* indicate support for government responsibility for providing social services and reducing inequality.

Dependent variable: vote choice

The second dependent variable of interest is vote choice, which is operationalized by grouping political parties into party families which share historical and ideological traditions, namely *conservative*, *social democratic*, *radical right*, *liberal*, *green,* and *radical left*. Details on the coding of party families, including a full list of parties, appear in Appendix 1.1.

[19] Other research on welfare state attitudes operationalizes the concept of deservingness in different ways, asking respondents whether specific groups deserve more or less money from the welfare state than they currently receive (Jeene *et al.* 2014), whether respondents are concerned about a certain group's living standards and their relative concern for each group in relation to others (Van Oorschot 2006), or most directly whether the members of a given group deserve financial assistance from the state or not (Van Oorschot 2000; Jensen and Petersen 2017).

Key independent variable: education

The central independent variable is *Education*. It is operationalized as an ordinal variable which uses the cross-nationally harmonized ISCED measure to capture the respondents' highest level of educational attainment. It ranges from less than a lower secondary education, to lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower tertiary, and finally a higher tertiary degree. This measure allows for a more fine-grained understanding of the effects of education on redistribution which can capture non-linearities in the relationship.

Controls

In keeping with other literature on attitudes towards redistribution, I also include a series of controls: female gender, religiosity (operationalized as never, rarely, or weekly church attendance), union membership (a dichotomous measure of respondents current or previous membership vs. never having been in a union), rural/urban location (an ordinal measure ranging from the reference category of farm or country village, town or small city, and suburbs, to big city), and age. In the main models, I do not control for income and class in order to avoid post-treatment bias, or 'overcontrol' (Elwert 2013); since these follow partly from education, they would be mediators, rather than confounders of educational effects on attitudes and vote choice.

Modelling

There are two types of models in the analyses. Since the attitudinal dependent variables are continuous, this paper first employs OLS regressions predicting *deservingness* perceptions

and *welfare state* attitudes with *Education* as the main independent variable, in addition to controls.

The second type of models are kappa mediation analyses based on logistic regressions predicting vote choice for a given party family. Assessing the extent to which the educational divide in electoral politics is mediated by *welfare state* and *deservingness* attitudes requires a means of decomposing the direct and indirect effects (via attitudes) of education on vote choice (Langsæther 2019a; Langsæther 2019b). Traditional mediation analysis is not appropriate for measuring the total effect of a categorical independent variable like education, since this would instead capture the effect for each education group relative to the reference category (Langsæther 2019b: 4). I instead employ the kappa index, which has previously been used to measure the direct and indirect effects of key structural variables like class and religion on voting (Hout *et al*. 1995; Manza & Brooks 1997; Evans & Tilley 2017; Langsæther 2019a; Langsæther 2019b).[20]

For a given party family, the kappa index is defined as the standard deviation of logistic regression coefficients of a given structural variable (in this case, levels of educational attainment) as a predictor of voting for that party family vs. all other party families.[21] Higher kappas signify greater differences in vote choice across educational groups. In deriving the kappas, I include only age and sex as control variables which are causally prior to education. The idea is to avoid controlling for other variables which could come after education in the causal chain in an attempt not to introduce post-treatment bias into my estimations of the effects of

[20] Since the outcome variable of voting is categorical, classic structural equation models are not appropriate, while GSEM models face convergence problems.

[21] A further set of analyses mentioned in the robustness checks on p. 49 will instead use logistic regressions predicting vote choice between two competing parties.

education (Langsaether 2019b: 4). In the first step of this analysis, I estimate the following logistic regressions for each party:

$$\ln\left(\frac{P_i}{1-P_i}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Education_i + B_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where *P* is the probability that respondent *i* voted for a given party family, $Education_i$ is a vector of dummy variables for each level of educational attainment, β_1 is a vector of the coefficients of these education dummies, and $Z_i$is a vector of control variables including age, sex, and country dummies. The "gross kappa" is the standard devation of coefficients in vector β_1, and represents the *total effect* of education on voting. The gross kappa for each party family is thus defined as:

$$\kappa = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{S=1}^{S}(\beta_s^j - \overline{\beta_s^J})^2}{S}}$$

Where β_s^j is the logistic regression coefficient associated with voting for party family *j* for a given level of education *s* (with the β for the reference category of the lowest level of education equal to 0), and $\overline{\beta_s^J}$ is the mean of the regression coefficients across all *S* levels of education (Ibid; Lachat 2006). To estimate the "net kappa", I re-estimate the logistic regression models including β_3 and β_4 as controls, which estimate the effects of *deservingness* and *welfare state* attitudes on vote choice, respectively. This net kappa represents the *direct effect* of education on voting, potentially attributable to socialization or group identity (Langsæther 2018).

Finally, the total effect minus the direct effect captures the *indirect effect* of education on voting: the effect of education on voting which is mediated through the channel of *deservingness* and *welfare state* attitudes. This is not a standard mediation analysis, but instead offers an approximate measure of the share of the association between education and vote choice explained by *deservingness* and *welfare state* (Langsæther 2019b; see also Tilley 2015 and Tilley & Evans 2017 for examples of similar approaches to decomposing effects of social structure on vote choice).

All models include country fixed-effects to account for unobserved characteristics of individual countries, as well as standard errors clustered at the country level.

Analyses

For descriptive purposes, Figure 6 displays the uncontrolled means of *deservingness* and *welfare state* across educational groups. The lowest educational group has both the most negative *deservingness* perceptions and the highest average *welfare state* support on average, but this relationship slowly reverses for increasingly higher levels of education. The tertiary educated represent nearly the opposite pattern: this group has by far the most positive perceptions of *deservingness* but also displays moderate opposition to the *welfare state*. Building upon Cavaillé's (2014: 199) finding for Great Britain, breaking down redistribution attitudes into subdimensions reveals educational groups across Western Europe to be cross-pressured.

Figure 6: Mean *Deservingness* and *Welfare State* by Education



Figure 7 shows an OLS model predicting *welfare state* attitudes under controls. The results demonstrate that the relationship between education and support for the welfare state is negative and statistically significant, under controls. All educational groups are less supportive of *welfare state* relative to the reference category of those with less than a lower secondary education. Effects range from an average reduction of about .08 standard deviation units in support for *welfare state* for lower secondary educated respondents relative to the reference category, to an average reduction of .33 standard deviation units for those with a higher tertiary education relative to the reference category. This offers support for Hypothesis 1 in line with the expectations of the political economy model.

Also in keeping with the literature, other statistically significant predictors of support for the *welfare state* among the controls include union membership, female gender, and living in a town or big city, while attending church is negatively and statistically significantly associated with support for the *welfare state*.

Figure 7: Determinants of *Welfare State* Support



Figure 8 reports the results of a model estimating the determinants of *deservingness*. The results show higher levels of education are strongly and statistically significantly associated with more positive perceptions of *deservingness* relative to the reference category of less than a secondary education, even after controlling for age, church attendance, and rural/urban location. Specifically, those with a lower tertiary education are on average .48 standard deviation units more positive and those with a higher tertiary education are on average .61 standard deviation units more positive on *deservingness* relative to the least educated. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Finally, in terms of controls, union membership and living in a suburb or big city were also statistically significantly associated with more positive *deservingness* perceptions. Rarely attending church is negatively and statistically significantly related to *deservingness* relative to never attending (while frequently attending is not). Female gender and age are not statistically significant predictors.

Figure 8: Determinants of *Deservingness* Perceptions



Table 4 displays the results of kappa mediation analyses. In Column A, we see that overall, the total effects of education on vote choice are strongest for the greens, followed by the radical right, and liberals. Educational attainment strongly differentiates who votes for these parties: on average, radical right voters have lower educational attainment and green voters have high levels of education. Conversely, total education effects are relatively weak among the social democrats, and even more so for the radical left and conservatives; in other words, vote choice for these parties is not strongly affected by education level. [22] Education effects on voting liberal are strong, but the effects are almost entirely direct (Columns B1 and B2); *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* attitudes explain virtually none of the effect of education on voting liberal. On balance, this is evidence against Hypotheses 3a and 3b: *welfare state* attitudes do not appear to substantially mediate the effects of education on voting for liberal and conservative

[22] The negative sign of some indirect effects for several party families such as the conservatives and radical left is evidence of suppression effects, where direct effects of education (controlling for attitudes) are bigger than total effects of education omitting attitudes. This means that when comparing low and high educated voters for these party families at a given level of *deservingness*, for example, educational differences in voting become larger. This is not uncommon in kappa mediation analyses (Langsaether 2019b:6). Since total education effects for these parties are so weak to begin with and kappa estimates have some degree of statistical uncertainty, they unlikely to be substantively meaningful.

parties, or for radical left parties. Column C2 shows that in the case of social democratic parties, *welfare state* attitudes are a substantial mediator of a fairly weak underlying total educational effect.

However, Column C1 shows that for greens and the radical right, parties which exemplify the educational divide in politics, *deservingness* perceptions explain a substantial portion of the education effect on voting (27% and 21% respectively). This is evidence consistent with Hypotheses 4a and 4b. This finding is noteworthy, as these are educationally-distinctive parties whose electoral bases are often understood primarily through the opposition of those with low and high levels of education on socio-cultural issues rather than issues of redistribution (e.g. Stubager 2010; Dolezal 2010). Overall, this procedure suggests that the indirect effect of education on vote choice via *deservingness* perceptions are generally much stronger than those via *welfare state* support.

Table 4: Direct & Indirect Effects of Education on Vote Choice

Party Family	A: Total Effect of Education on Vote (Gross Kappa)	B1: Direct Effect of Education on Vote (Net Kappa), Controlling for *Deservingness*	B2: Direct Effect of Education on Vote (Net Kappa), Controlling for *Welfare State*	C1: Indirect Effect of Education on Vote (via *Deservingness* Values)	C2: Indirect Effect of Education on Vote (via *Welfare State* Values)
Conservatives	.096	.144	.111	-.048	-.015
Social Democrats	.147	.197	.109	-.051	.038
Radical Right	.587	.461	.594	.126	-.007
Greens	.576	.416	.594	.156	-.019
Radical Left	.097	.128	.109	-.031	-.013
Liberals	.436	.474	.424	-.037	.012

However, there is some evidence that *welfare state* attitudes as well as *deservingness* perceptions are an important mediator of education effects on vote choice in more fine-grained comparisons between adjacent party families competing in political space. To take one noteworthy example, there is a fairly strong positive effect of education on the likelihood of voting for conservative parties vs. radical right parties.[23] Kappa mediation analyses decomposing this education effect show that 13% of the total effect of education on voting for radical right parties compared to conservative parties is an indirect effect of education via *welfare state* attitudes, compared to about 11% via *deservingness* perceptions.[24] In other words, attitudes which are not necessarily mediators of education effects in predicting voting for a given party family vs. all other party families can nonetheless be important mediators in education effects on voting for party families which contest for specific blocs of voters. Overall, then, evidence related to Hypothesis 3a is mixed.

Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks

This section addresses four possible concerns regarding the validity of these results. The first argument suggests that higher educational attainment is substantially more likely if one's parents are also highly educated and/or from a privileged occupational group. As a result, the relationship between education and *deservingness* perceptions or *welfare state* attitudes might be spurious, if the true cause was parental background. In Appendix 2.3, I control for parental

[23] As the growth of radical right party vote shares has challenged the center right has intensified, electoral competition between the two has become an area of increasing scholarly focus (Webb and Bale 2014; Pardos-Prado 2015; Abou-Chadi and Immergut 2019; Gidron and Ziblatt 2019).

[24] In analyzing a logistic regression predicting radical right vs. conservative voting, the total effects of education (or gross kappa)= .546. The indirect effects of education on vote choice= .071 for *welfare state* and .051 for *deservingness*. Methodologically, modelling vote choice in this way assumes IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives), but this is mathematically equivalent to the standard multinomial logistic regression predicting vote choice, which makes a series of logistic comparisons between each party and an omitted reference category (Alvarez and Nagler 1988).

educational attainment and for father's occupation in a model predicting attitudes. The results show that education effects on *welfare state* attitudes and *deservingness* perceptions shrink by about 20%, but education remains a substantial and statistically significant predictor of these attitudes after controlling for parental background.

A second concern relates to the theoretical grounding of the negative relationship between education and *welfare state* support. Some scholars have argued that socialization processes occurring within educational institutions themselves are what links higher education to opposition to redistribution, rather than the relative insulation of the highly-educated from economic risk. In top-down socialization processes, professors can transmit ideas related to the efficiency costs of redistribution (Gelepithis and Giani 2020: 11), while in bottom-up socialization processes, social networks in universities concentrate disproportionately wealthy populations of students who influence each other's beliefs about meritocracy and inequality (Mendelberg et al. 2017; Gelepithis and Giani 2020). If education's effects on *welfare state* support stemmed from the inculcation of anti-redistributive norms in higher education institutions, rather than educational differences in economic risk, then the theorized mechanism would change substantially.

In Appendix 2.4, two predictive models add controls, the first of which more directly tests the mechanism of risk, while the second tests the alternative explanation rooted in economic ideas imparted through socialization in the university.[25] I find that negative education effects on *welfare state* attitudes are weakened by about a quarter when controlling for subjective economic

[25] Introducing measures of risk and norms which may follow causally from education has the potential to introduce post-treatment bias in the estimates of education effects on redistribution attitudes. This concern about overcontrol is the reason such variables are omitted from the analysis up to this point. Their introduction here should be understood as comparing alternative causal paths between education and *welfare state* support, rather than assessing the magnitude of education effects.

insecurity, but still remain statistically and substantively significant. The socialization model controls for two beliefs that redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses: that social benefits and services place too great a strain on business, and place too great a strain on the economy generally. Those controls do not weaken the relationship between education and *welfare state* attitudes. Furthermore, while negative education effects on *welfare state* support are strongest at the higher tertiary level, there is virtually no difference between the magnitude of effects at the vocational level as opposed to the lower tertiary level, a key theorized site of socialization. While not dispositive, this evidence is consistent with the idea that a risk mechanism is in play linking education to lower levels of *welfare state* support and is inconsistent with the idea that the negative effect of education on *welfare state* support is due to the transmission of ideas in universities that redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses.

A third potential concern with this paper's approach comes from a vibrant emerging literature in this field arguing that contemporary redistributive conflict stems not from the competing preferences of socio-structural groups for a bigger or smaller welfare state, but instead for different *types* of social spending, particularly for social investment policies vs. social consumption policies (e.g. Beramendi *et al.* 2015; Häusermann *et al.* 2015; Garritzmann et al. 2018). On this view, the highly educated are a key support group behind social investment policies such as childcare and training designed to facilitate labor market participation, while those with lower levels of education instead support passive consumption policies such as pension and unemployment benefits. Essentially, this would suggest that the *welfare state* subdimension may be misspecified.

I lack the space to present full analyses here. However, in Appendix 2.5, I decompose my *welfare state* measure to examine the relationship between education and support for state

responsibility in specific policy areas covering both social consumption and social investment. I present evidence that education is negatively associated with support for government responsibility for maintaining the living standards of the elderly and unemployed, both of which fall under social consumption. However, education is also negatively associated with support for government responsibility for ensuring sufficient childcare services for working parents, a key social investment policy. These results suggest that education is negatively associated with preferences for the scope of the welfare state generally, rather than having different effects for beliefs about government responsibility in the domains of social investment and social consumption.

Finally, one could argue that estimates of the effects of education both on *deservingness* perceptions and on vote choice, are biased by the omission from the models of other attitudes associated with the educational divide, namely socio-cultural positions on immigration and the EU (Stubager 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2017). In Appendix 2.6, I include controls for both immigration and EU attitudes in both models predicting *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support and kappa mediation models decomposing direct and indirect effects of education on voting. Education effects on both subdimensions of attitudes are robust to these controls, with coefficients virtually unchanged for *welfare state,* and moderately reduced but still statistically significant for *deservingness*. In the kappa mediation models, introducing both immigration and EU attitudes as controls decreases the size of the indirect effects of education via *deservingness* perception on both radical right and green voting. However, even after these controls, such indirect effects via *deservingness* perceptions still account for about 13% and 23% of the total education effects on both radical right and green voting, respectively.

In sum, the effects of education on vote choice via *welfare state* support and *deservingness perceptions* are robust to several plausible alternative explanations, such as parental background, investment or consumption preferences, and socio-cultural attitudes toward immigration and the EU. This paper does not claim that attitudes other than the *welfare state* support and *deservingness* perceptions are irrelevant to educational differences in vote choice. Rather, these findings suggest these two redistributive subdimensions are mechanisms linking education to vote choice, over and above these other influences.

Discussion

This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it draws on literature in sociology and social psychology to argue that education represents a status divide, and not only a divide rooted in economic risk or socio-cultural attitudes. Status differentials between those with lower and higher levels of education mean they differ in their proclivity to sharply demarcate themselves from the needy in order to maintain their own social esteem. While material insecurity pushes the lower educated towards support for a more muscular welfare state, status insecurity inclines them towards harsher judgments of welfare state beneficiaries. I find that higher levels of education are on average associated with more positive attitudes towards the *deservingness* of welfare state beneficiaries compared to less-educated individuals, but are also associated with more negative attitudes towards the scope of the *welfare state*, in keeping with the political economy literature.

Second, I examine to what extent educational divides over redistribution contribute to the emergent education cleavage in electoral politics. Less educated voters, who on average see welfare state beneficiaries as undeserving, are disproportionately attracted to the radical right;

highly educated voters who on average have the most positive perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to support green parties. Results of kappa mediation analyses suggest these different perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries explain in part why green and radical right voters represent the poles of the education cleavage.

Evidence on the role of attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state in mediating educational effects on vote choice is more mixed. However, *welfare state* attitudes are found to mediate education effects in a more fine-grained analysis of vote choice between competing party families, specifically the radical right and center-right. Differences in attitudes on *both* the *welfare state* and *deservingness* subdimensions help to explain why on the Right, the lower educated vote disproportionately for radical right parties over conservative parties, potentially consistent with research arguing that these voters are characterized more strongly by welfare chauvinist attitudes than outright hostility to redistribution (van der Waal *et al.* 2010).

In sum, education has typically been understood as a structural divide linked to parties primarily competing on the socio-cultural, rather than the economic dimension (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Stubager 2009; Stubager 2010). However, this appears partly to be a function of how redistribution attitudes are measured. A deservingness/welfare state framework suggests that the educational divide in party politics is also an expression of redistributive conflict, but in a multi-dimensional way. These results suggest that education is associated with vote choice both directly and indirectly, via differences in attitudes not just about the proper scope of the welfare state, but even more strongly about the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries themselves.

As educationally distinctive radical right and green parties continue to gain ground electorally, scholars have begun to focus on their impacts on social policy both in and outside of government (Afonso & Rennwald 2018; Abou-Chadi & Immergut 2019; Chueri 2020; Röth and

Schwander 2020). This paper helps clarify the contours of redistribution attitudes held by the core social support groups of these parties, with consequences for both their welfare state agendas and the constraints imposed by the opinions of their voters. With their success in attracting a lower education base of voters, radical right parties may risk greater backlash from their base for supporting the retrenchment of welfare state programs (Afonso 2015). However, the particularly negative perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries in the eyes of their voters may give radical right parties leeway to pursue certain kinds of spending cuts if framed around punishing benefit cheating by the undeserving (Chueri 2020). Conversely, green parties' growing success among highly educated voters with the most positive views of the needy ties them to an electoral base that may be particularly averse to the kinds of negative conditionality frequently imposed upon the poor and unemployed.

To further contextualize and explore these results, more research is needed. When groups are cross-pressured across two attitudinal dimensions, the relative salience of each dimension becomes crucial for vote choice. Prior research into this question has often focused on how cross pressures between socio-cultural and economic attitudes are resolved in vote choice (Lefkofridi *et al.* 2014; Gidron 2020). However, the findings of this paper suggest a new way in which this also applies to the alignment of different social groups in redistributive conflicts. Since, on average, educational groups take internally conflicted positions in terms of *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* support, future research examining what drives changes in these subdimensions' relative salience over time can help us better understand the evolution of the education cleavage.

CHAPTER 3: REASSESSING THE "GENDER GAP" IN REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS (Co-authored with Andreas Jozwiak and Kaitlin Alper)

Introduction

Gender gaps in political behavior have long been a significant object of analysis for social scientists. Broadly speaking, scholars in the formative period of this literature in the 1970s and 1980s found that women were more politically conservative than men (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). However this pattern has reversed in recent decades, with women increasingly more left-wing, likely to vote for left-wing parties, and more ideologically left-wing relative to male co-partisans (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Box-Steffensmeyer et al. 2004; Barnes and Cassese 2017). Gendered differences in redistribution attitudes have been a particular area of focus, as a core dimension of political and party competition (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003; Shorrocks and Grasso 2020).

Two broad schools of thought have motivated scholarly debate about the nature of the gender gap created by women's supportive stance towards redistribution, relative to men. Some interpret women's backing for redistribution as self-interested, in light of the disproportionate material insecurity they face (Schwander and Häusermann 2013; Häusermann et al. 2015; Häusermann et al. 2016; Shorrocks and Grasso 2020). Others argue women have greater empathy for the needy owing to their gendered socialization into caring roles and responsibilities (Gilligan 1982; Diekman and Glick 2018; Kamas and Preston 2019).

Much of this literature, however, has measured redistribution attitudes on a single dimension related to inequality and social spending. Meanwhile, the measurement of redistribution attitudes has undergone a substantial transformation, with a variety of innovative explorations of their *multidimensionality* (e.g. Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and Trump 2015; Garritzman et al. 2018). Measurement rooted in the separation between self-oriented and other-oriented attitudes to redistribution allows us to more accurately test extant explanations for the gender gap.

Analyzing 2016 European Social Survey data, we examine the effect of gender both on attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state and those about the deservingness of recipients. Contrary to expectations of social role theory, we find that female gender is *not* statistically significantly associated with perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries as deserving. Female gender *is*, however, associated with support for an expansive welfare state.

At most, only a modest amount of this gender gap appears to be a compositional effect of women's greater material insecurity. However, further analyses reveal an interaction effect between gender and various measures of economic position. The economically precarious are on average supportive of an expansive welfare state regardless of gender, while negative effects of economic success on support for the welfare state are significantly weakened for comfortable and affluent women relative to their male counterparts. In sum, these tests suggest that while the gender gap relates to welfare state preferences rather than forgiving attitudes towards the needy, it is not relative material insecurity that drives it. Instead, it is the relative support for the welfare state among *affluent* women, in contrast to affluent men that stands out.

Self-Interest or Empathy? Theories of the Gender Gap in Redistribution Attitudes

Cross-nationally, women and female-headed households have lower incomes and are at disproportionate risk of poverty. Women are disproportionately employed in lower paying occupations than men, are more likely to work in precarious part-time jobs, suffer career interruptions and associated income losses due to care responsibilities, and face pay discrimination relative to men, even in the same jobs (Misra and Close 2014; Gornick and Boeri 2016). These disadvantages make the welfare state central for the position of women in society. It can not only directly compensate for gendered labor market risk, but also offer work-family reconciliation policies that give women more autonomy in their career choices and economic independence from male partners (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Orloff 2010). Political economists have argued this relative economic precarity underlies women's relative support for redistribution; from the perspective of self-interest, women support redistribution because they are net beneficiaries of social programs and services (Schwander & Häusermann 2013; Häusermann et al. 2015; Shorrocks & Grasso 2020).

Social psychological explanations of the gender gap in redistribution instead point to gendered differences in socialization leading to different preferences over redistribution (Healy and Malhotra 2013). Social role theorists have argued that women are socialized into roles which emphasize an "ethic of caring" for the vulnerable, while male roles emphasize individual agency (Gilligan 1982; Diekman & Glick 2018). Empirically, both surveys and field experiments in the American context have found women to be more compassionate and empathetic towards the disadvantaged than men (Eagly et al. 2004; Diekman & Schneider 2010; Blinder & Rolfe 2018; Diekman & Glick 2018).

Recent advances in the measurement of redistribution attitudes offer the opportunity to better test these explanations of the gender gap. While earlier literature focused on preferences for a more or less encompassing welfare state, scholars have increasingly argued that redistribution attitudes are multidimensional (e.g. Bonoli 2007; Häusermann 2010; Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Garritzmann et al. 2018). Of particular interest here is the conceptual distinction between self-oriented and other-oriented attitudes to redistribution. In keeping with canonical models in political economy which view individuals as self-interested income-maximizers (Meltzer & Richard 1981), Cavaillé & Trump (2015) argue that that attitudes about inequality and the scope of the welfare state highlight the material benefits and costs associated with redistributive programs. In line with this theoretical expectation, they find that responses to survey items which tap these attitudes are stratified by income. However, they theorize that survey items that solicit evaluations of the worthiness of benefit recipients do not prime respondents' material self-interest, but rather their empathy for and social affinity with the needy. Consistent with their theory, Cavaillé & Trump (2015) find that attitudes on this subdimension are not stratified by income. This two-dimensional measurement allows us to directly test empathetic and self-interest-based explanations for the gender gap.

First, if the gender gap in redistribution attitudes is driven by empathy, then we should expect women to have more positive attitudes about the deservingness of the needy.

H1: on average, women have more positive deservingness perceptions than men.

If, by contrast, gender differences in redistribution attitudes are driven by self-interest, then we should expect women to have higher levels of support for an expansive welfare state than men (H2).

H2: *on average, female gender is associated with greater support for the welfare state than male gender*.

Data and Methods

The 2016 European Social Survey is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses because it includes an extensive battery of questions on redistributive preferences and attitudes as well as a variety of different measures of economic insecurity across a range of countries. We analyze 15 Western European countries[26] in order to examine the relationship between gender and attitudes towards redistribution, extending comparative coverage beyond studies of the gender gap which focus on one or a handful of cases. Below, we explain the operationalization of our variables.

Dependent variables: deservingness perceptions and welfare state support

Our dependent variables measure attitudes towards redistribution. Previous cross-national research on attitudes towards redistribution often employs a single survey item which asks about respondents' support or opposition to government redistribution of incomes. This is because most cross-national survey datasets lack an adequate number of items on attitudes towards

[26] Countries included in the analyses are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

redistribution which are repeated over multiple survey waves. However, this operationalization is both theoretically and empirically problematic if attitudes towards redistribution are multi-dimensional (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 146).

To capture the multidimensional structure of redistribution attitudes, we use principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation. We retain the two strongest factors, which we call *deservingness* and *welfare state*, corresponding to Cavaillé & Trump (2015)'s "*redistribution to*" and "*redistribution from*", respectively.[27] *Deservingness* explains around 24% of the variance and *welfare state* around 23% of the variance in redistribution attitudes. Both variables are standardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, so effect sizes can be easily compared.

[27] This paper uses the conceptual labels of *deservingness* and *welfare state* because they capture general orientations towards welfare state beneficiaries (the unemployed as well as the poor) and the preferences for the scope of government social policy. The survey questions used to construct the dependent variables in this paper overlap with those used to construct the dimensions of "Redistribution To" and "Redistribution From" in Cavaillé (2014) and Cavaille & Trump (2015) from 2008 European Social Survey data, but not all questions from the 2008 survey wave were available in the 2016 ESS.

Table 5: Rotated Factor Loadings

Survey Item	Deservingness	Welfare State
Government should reduce differences in income levels	-.020	**.414**
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts	.112	**.315**
For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small	.036	**.376**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the elderly	-.086	**.478**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed	.150	**.407**
It should be government's responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents	-.073	**.418**
Many manage to obtain benefits they are not entitled to	**.420**	-.127
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people lazy	**.525**	.057
Social benefits and services in [respondent's country] make people less willing to care for each other	**.503**	.004
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job	**.495**	-.017

(Strongest factor loadings in bold)

Questions that best load onto the *deservingness* component ask survey respondents to judge the worthiness of people who receive social benefits and services and the effects of government assistance on recipients' sense of personal and social responsibility.[28] Our theoretical framework suggests these "other-oriented" items should measure respondents' empathy with benefit recipients. Higher values of *deservingness* indicate more positive views towards benefit recipients.

[28] Other research on redistribution attitudes operationalizes deservingness in alternative ways, asking whether certain groups deserve more or less money from the welfare state than they currently get (Jeene *et al.* 2014), whether respondents are concerned about a particular group's living standards and their relative concern for each group in relation to others (Van Oorschot 2006), or most directly whether the members of a given group deserve financial support from the state or not (Van Oorschot 2000; Jensen and Petersen 2017).

Questions that load most heavily onto the *welfare state* component concern attitudes towards the scope of government responsibility in social and economic policy and inequality reduction. According to our theory, questions of government responsibility should provoke a calculation of self-interest, in which respondents ask themselves whether or not they would personally benefit from redistribution. Higher values on *welfare state* indicate support for government responsibility for providing social services and lowering inequality.

Independent Variables

Our key independent variable is *female* gender, whose effects on *deservingness* and *welfare state* attitudes are the subject of hypotheses H1 and H2. To avoid omitted variable bias in our estimation of gender effects, we further include controls for age, religiosity (measured by attending religious services), education, union membership, and rural/urban location, which have been found to predict support for redistribution.

Modelling Strategy

Since our dependent variables are continuous, we use OLS regression models. We include country fixed effects to account for unobserved country-level variation and cluster standard errors at the country-level to account for autocorrelation. The first two models predict *deservingness* and *welfare state* attitudes, respectively, with *female* gender and a vector of controls. The next step will predict *welfare state* support with *female* gender and a variety of additional controls which measure economic position, to assess the theorized self-interest mechanism for this relationship.[29]

[29] A parallel process of mechanism-testing is not necessary for the *deservingness*-gender relationship, because *deservingness* is a direct measure of empathy.

Results

H1 set out the expectation that women will have more positive perceptions of the *deservingness* of the needy because socialized gender roles, defined by care responsibilities, lead women to have higher levels of empathy relative to men. Panels A and B of Figure 1 display the effects of gender on *deservingness* perceptions and *welfare state* attitudes, under controls. On the first row of Panel A, the estimated effect of *female* gender on *deservingness* attitudes is not statistically significantly different from zero. Contrary to the expectations of H1, we do not find that women are more empathetic towards the needy than men.

H2 set out the expectation that women will be more supportive of the *welfare state*, relative to men. On the first row of panel B, we see that the effect of *female* gender on *welfare state* attitudes is statistically significantly positive ($p<.01$). On average, *female* gender is associated with a .15 unit increase in *welfare state* support. This is evidence consistent with Hypothesis H2.

Figure 9: Gender Effects on *Deservingness* and *Welfare State*

Panel A (*Deservingness*)



Panel B (*Welfare State*)



Note: models include country fixed-effects (not reported), with standard errors clustered at the country-level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Exploring the Self-Interest Mechanism Linking Gender to *Welfare State* Support

Overall, these results find that women are significantly more in favor of an expansive welfare state relative to men, but do not perceive the needy to be more deserving. However, without directly testing the mechanism for the relationship between gender and *welfare state* support, we do not yet have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that differences in economic security explain this gender gap. To assess the self-interest mechanism hypothesized to link

gender to *welfare state* support, we use a series of staggered OLS models, beginning with a baseline mode predicting *welfare state* attitudes with gender, controlling only for age, religiosity, and urban location. Subsequent models add controls first for objective, and then, subjective measures of economic position. The full model includes all predictors. Observing changes from the baseline model in the size and significance of the coefficient for gender is the central aim here. If self-interest is the primary explanation for women's greater relative *welfare state* support, then controlling for economic resources should significantly reduce (if not eliminate) the effect of gender.

As we see in Table 6, Models 2 and 3 tell a broadly similar story. Most objective and subjective measures of economic (in)security are statistically significantly associated with greater *welfare state support*, in the expected direction.[30] Respondents with higher income, those who feel secure in their incomes, those who have a job with an unlimited contract (rather than a fixed-term contract or no contract) and those who think it is very unlikely they'll lose their jobs on average are less supportive of the *welfare state* than their more precarious counterparts. In sum, there is substantial evidence that economic self-interest conditions support or opposition to the *welfare state*. However, the introduction of these controls, either on their own (in Models 2 and 3) or all at once (in the Full Model) leads to modest or no reductions in the positive effect of *female* gender on *welfare state* support. In other words, while self-interest does have substantial effects on *welfare state* attitudes, differences in economic resources between men and women do not appear to explain the gender gap in attitudes.

[30] Part-time employment is not statistically significantly related to *welfare state* attitudes, while employment status itself has somewhat mixed effects in relation to precarity. On average, the sick or disabled have more supportive *welfare state* attitudes relative to those who are working, while surprisingly the discouraged unemployed are less supportive.

Table 6: Testing The Mechanism for Gender Effects on *Welfare State* Attitudes

	Baseline model (Gender+controls)	**Model 2 (Objective economic security)**	**Model 3 (Subjective Economic Security)**	**Full Model**
Female	.13*** (.03)	.12**(.03)	.13**(.03)	.13**(.04)
Income	X	-.04***(.00)	X	-.03**(.00)
Employment Status (ref: working)	X		X	
Student	X	-.07(.04)	X	-.04(.05)
Unemployed	X	.03(.05)	X	-.08(.05)
Discouraged unemployed	X	-.19*(.06)	X	-.30(.05)***
Sick or Disabled	X	.25***(.04)	X	.24**(.05)
Retired	X	-.02(.03)	X	-.03(.02)
Homemaker	X	.04(.02)	X	.06(.02)*
Part-time Employment	X	-.03(.02)	X	-.02(.02)
Fixed/no contract (ref: unlimited contract)	X	.07*(.02)	X	.08*(.03)
Subjective income insecurity (ref: living comfortably on income	X	X	X	
Coping on income	X	X	.18***(.01)	.13**(.03)
Difficult on income	X	X	.32***(.07)	.27**(.04)
Very difficult on income	X	X	.42***(.04)	.36***(.05)
Subjective job insecurity (ref: not at all likely to be unemployed in next year)	X	X	X	
Not very likely	X	X	.02(.01)	-.00(.02)
Likely	X	X	.02(.03)	-.04(.04)
Very likely	X	X	.15***(.03)	.11*(.05)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	25,158	17,391	20,024	14,441
R^2	.12	.15	.15	.17

Exploring Conditional Effects of Gender on *Welfare State* Support Across the Economic Distribution

Thus far, our results show that gender gap is present on the *welfare state* subdimension, but not the *deservingness* subdimension. Theoretically, this suggests that gender differences in redistribution attitudes are not rooted in empathy for the needy, stemming from socialized gender roles. However, our mechanism test yielded no evidence that the significant gender gap in *welfare state* support could be explained by self-interest. That said, a vein of recent literature on redistribution attitudes argues that the effects of self-interest on redistribution preferences are conditional, rather than operating the same way for all groups of people (Dimick et al. 2016; Rueda & Stegmueller 2016; Rueda 2017; Cavaillé 2017; Dimick et al. 2018; Armingeon & Weistanner 2021). While multifaceted, these arguments share in common the idea that the pressing needs of those at the bottom of the economic distribution make them more likely to support redistribution and the parties that promise it regardless of other considerations, while there is greater *variation* in preferences and voting behavior among those in the middle and top of the economic distribution.[31] This conditionality of self-interest effects may shed light on why self-interest seems to significantly affect redistribution attitudes without explaining the gender gap.

Is it the case that gender effects on support for redistribution similarly vary across levels of material comfort? To explore further, in Figure 10 we examine the interaction of gender and

[31] More specifically, Rueda (2017) argues that parochial altruism plays a greater role in redistributive preferences for the rich than the poor. Dimick et al. (2016) find that the redistributive preferences of the rich are more sensitive to inequality than the poor, while relatedly, Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) argue that the redistributive preferences of the rich are conditioned by crime as an externality of inequality—such that rich people living in higher crime areas are more likely to support redistribution. Cavaillé (2017) finds that the preferences of those who are reliant on social transfers are less affected than beliefs about free-riding and abuse of the welfare system relative to those with more comfortable incomes. Finally, Armingeon and Weistanner (2021) find that left-right ideology has a stronger effect on redistribution attitudes at the middle and top of the income distribution, relative to those at the bottom.

income and gender and employment on *welfare state* support. Panel A shows the marginal effect of gender on *welfare state support* across the household income distribution,[32] while Panel B displays the marginal effect of gender on *welfare state* support for the employed versus the unemployed. Both show a similar pattern. Gender does not have a statistically significant effect on *welfare state* support for those at the bottom of the income distribution. Instead, gender effects emerge and widen among the more affluent, with higher-income men less supportive of the *welfare state*, relative to their more secure female counterparts. Likewise, there are no statistically significant gender effects among the unemployed, while employment for men-- but not women—is associated with a drop in support for the *welfare state*.

[32] Ideally, we would prefer to analyze individual rather than household income. Unfortunately, the ESS has no individual measures of income.

Figure 10: Gender Effects on *Welfare State* Support Across the Economic Spectrum



Discussion

Two different theoretical explanations for the gender gap are rooted in economic self-interest, and gendered empathy. Breaking down redistribution attitudes into *welfare state* support and *deservingness* perceptions gives us additional analytical leverage on the debate over the

gender gap in redistribution attitudes. This multidimensional framework both offers us more precise information on the substance of gender gap in redistribution attitudes, and allows us to adjudicate between self-interested and other-oriented explanations.

We find no evidence that there are gendered differences in empathy for the needy, in contrast to the expectations of social role theory. Instead, women are more supportive than men of an expansive welfare state. Next, we test the mechanism for the gender gap theorized by political economists by adding controls for objective and subjective economic security. Introducing these controls has little to no effect on the size of the gender gap in *welfare state* support. This suggests gender effects on redistribution attitudes are not simply compositional; women are not more supportive of redistribution than men simply because they are more economically precarious on average.

Subsequent analyses took inspiration from an emerging vein of literature on redistribution attitudes. The core insight of these works is that the effects of self-interest on attitudes towards redistribution are conditional—with less extreme material need, there is greater variation among those in the middle and higher economic strata. In a similar vein, we find that strength of the link between economic position and support for the *welfare state* varies between men and women—but only for those in relatively comfortable economic positions. Men's attitudes towards the *welfare state*, significantly more than those of women, become sharply negative in the middle and upper ends of the economic distribution.

These conditional effects of gender across the income distribution likely help to explain why a battery of controls for economic position do not shrink the gender gap in *welfare state support* in our initial analyses. However, this still leaves open the question of why gender effects on *welfare state* attitudes exist at the middle and top of the economic spectrum. At this stage, a

full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper and must be taken up in future research.

One possible response is that women's redistribution attitudes are sensitive to *relative* income compared to male partners, which affects women's bargaining power within the household. Alper (2019)'s cross-national study finds that women at the middle and higher reaches of the household income distribution have the biggest relative income gaps, and thus power differentials, with their male partners. Sensitivity to relative income differences within the household could explain sharp gender differences in *welfare state* support, but testing this would require more detailed data which decomposes economic resources held by men and women within shared households.[33] Another possibility is that gender differences are shaped by existing national welfare state, family policy, or growth regimes, which shape both the social risks and supports of men and women, and, in turn, their attitudes. Future research should employ multilevel models or cluster analysis to analyze the mechanisms linking gender differences in *welfare state* support across different national contexts.

[33] Surprisingly (in analysis not presented here for space reasons), introducing controls for marital status and children living in the household similarly had no detectable effect on the gender gap in *welfare state* support.

APPENDIX 1.1: PARTY FAMILY CODINGS

Party family codings were derived by triangulating between codings from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015), ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019), and author's own judgment. Parties are listed by party family, and within party families alphabetically by country and party name. Parties falling under the party family category "Other" were a mix of single-issue parties, regionalist parties, confessional parties and when ESS respondents reported voting for an unspecified "other party" or "independents." Results for voters of these parties were not reported both for parsimony's sake and because I lack strong theoretical expectations for the educational or ideological profile of said voters in terms of *welfare state* attitudes or *deservingness* perceptions.

Table 7: List of Parties by Party Family and Country

Party Family	Party Name	Country
Conservatives	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Austria
Conservatives	Christian People's Party /Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CVP/CD&V)	Belgium
Conservatives	Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH)	Belgium
Conservatives	People's Party (PP)	Belgium
Conservatives	Finnish Christian League (SKL/KD)	Finland
Conservatives	National Coalition Party (KOK)	Finland
Conservatives	Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	France
Conservatives	Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	Germany
Conservatives	Fianna Fáil (FF)	Ireland
Conservatives	Fine Gael (FG)	Ireland
Conservatives	Future and Freedom (FLI)	Italy
Conservatives	People of Liberty (PdL)	Italy
Conservatives	The Right (La Destra)	Italy
Conservatives	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Netherlands
Conservatives	Christian Union (CU)	Netherlands
Conservatives	Reformed Political Party (SGP)	Netherlands
Conservatives	Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	Norway
Conservatives	Conservative Party (H)	Norway
Conservatives	Democratic and Social Center/People's Party (CDS/PP)	Portugal
Conservatives	Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV)	Spain
Conservatives	Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT)	Spain
Conservatives	People's Party (PP)	Spain
Conservatives	Moderate Party (M)	Sweden
Conservatives	Christian Democrats (KD)	Sweden
Conservatives	Christian Social Party/Humanist Democratic Centre (PSC/CDH)	Switzerland
Conservatives	Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (BDP)	Switzerland
Conservatives	Conservative People's Party (CVP-PDC)	Switzerland
Conservatives	Protestant People's Party (EVP-PEP)	Switzerland
Conservatives	Conservative Party (Cons)	United Kingdom

Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family and Country

Social Democrats	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	Austria
Social Democrats	Socialist Party (PS)	Belgium
Social Democrats	Socialist Party (SP/SPA)	Belgium
Social Democrats	Social Democratic Party of Finland (SPD)	Finland
Social Democrats	Socialist Party (PS)	France
Social Democrats	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	Germany
Social Democrats	Labour (LAB)	Ireland
Social Democrats	Democratic Party (PD)	Italy
Social Democrats	Left Ecology and Liberty (SEL)	Italy
Social Democrats	Labour Party (PvdA)	Netherlands
Social Democrats	Norwegian Labour Party (DNA)	Norway
Social Democrats	Socialist Party (PS)	Portugal
Social Democrats	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Spain
Social Democrats	Workers Party- Social Democrats (SAP)	Sweden
Social Democrats	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	Switzerland
Social Democrats	Labour Party (Lab)	United Kingdom
Radical Left	Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ)	Austria
Radical Left	Workers Party of Belgium (PVDA+/PTB)	Belgium
Radical Left	The Left (LINKE)	Germany
Radical Left	Left Alliance (VAS)	Finland
Radical Left	Left Front (FdG)	France
Radical Left	New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA)	France
Radical Left	Workers' Struggle (LO)	France
Radical Left	Anti-Austerity Alliance (AAA)	Ireland
Radical Left	Sínn Fein (SF)	Ireland
Radical Left	Civil Revolution	Italy
Radical Left	Socialist Party (SP)	Netherlands
Radical Left	Socialist Left Party (SV)	Norway
Radical Left	The Red Party (Rødt)	Norway
Radical Left	Left Bloc (BE)	Portugal
Radical Left	Unitary Democratic Coalition (PCP-PEV)	Portugal
Radical Left	Unidos Podemos	Spain
Radical Left	Left Party (V)	Sweden
Radical Left	Feminist Initiative (FI)	Sweden

Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family

Radical Right	Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB)	Belgium
Radical Right	Danish People's Party (DF)	Denmark
Radical Right	Alternative For Germany (AfD)	Germany
Radical Right	National Front (FN)	France
Radical Right	Movement for France (MPF)	France
Radical Right	National Alliance (AN)	Italy
Radical Right	Northern League (LN)	Italy
Radical Right	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands
Radical Right	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	United Kingdom
Radical Right	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Austria
Radical Right	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	Austria
Radical Right	True Finns (PS)	Finland
Radical Right	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Sweden
Radical Right	Progress Party (Fr)	Norway
Radical Right	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	Switzerland
Greens	The Austrian Green Party (Grüne)	Austria
Greens	AGALEV/Green!	Belgium
Greens	Ecolo	Belgium
Greens	Green League (VIHR)	Finland
Greens	Green Party (VERTS)	France
Greens	Alliance 90/The Greens	Germany
Greens	Green Party (GP)	Ireland
Greens	GreenLeft (GL)	Netherlands
Greens	Party for the Animals (PvdD)	Netherlands
Greens	Green Party (MDG)	Norway
Greens	Environment Party- The Greens (MP)	Sweden
Greens	Greens (Grüne)	Switzerland
Greens	Green Liberals (GPL-PVL)	Switzerland
Greens	Green Party (Green)	United Kingdom

Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family

Liberals	Liberal Forum/New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS)	Austria
Liberals	Team Stronach	Austria
Liberals	Liberal Reformist Party (PRL/MR)	Belgium
Liberals	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD)	Belgium
Liberals	Centre Party (KESK)	Finland
Liberals	New Centre (NC)	France
Liberals	Union for French Democracy (UDF/MODEM)	France
Liberals	Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Germany
Liberals	Civic Choice (SC)	Italy
Liberals	Union of the Center (UDC)	Italy
Liberals	Citizens (Cs)	Spain
Liberals	Democrats 66 (D66)	Netherlands
Liberals	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Netherlands
Liberals	Centre Party (SP)	Norway
Liberals	Venstre (V)	Norway
Liberals	Centre Party (C)	Sweden
Liberals	Liberal People's Party (FP)	Sweden
Liberals	FDP. The Liberals (FDP/PLR)	Switzerland
Liberals	Liberal Democratic Party (LibDem)	United Kingdom

APPENDIX 1.2: FULL MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

The following tables report multinomial logistic regression results including controls not reported in Table 2 (page 19). Multinomial logistic regression imposes a comparison with an omitted base outcome. In this case, the omitted category is voting for a conservative party. Coefficients thus represent effects of a given independent variable on the probability of voting for a certain party family *relative to voting for a conservative party*. Because the multinomial logistic regression is all one model, accompanying model fit statistics and other information can be found at the end, below Table 8e.

Table 8a: Predicting Social Democratic Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting)

Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Deservingness	**.37*****(.03)
Welfare State	**.47*****(.09)
Income	-.02(.02)
Subjective Economic Insecurity	.03(.11)
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	-.01(.14)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	-.30(.21)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	-.13(.18)
Advanced Vocational	-.31(.21)
Lower Tertiary	-.26(.25)
Higher Tertiary	-.16(.27)
Occupational Class (reference category: Technical Semi-Professional)	
Self-Employed Professionals & Large Employers	-.28(.32)
Small Business Owners	**-.52***(.22)
Production Workers	.03(.14)
Associate Managers	**-.26***(.10)
Clerks	-.11(.12)
Socio-Cultural Professionals	-.06(.15)
Service Workers	.25(.15)
Union	**.48*****(.07)
Urban (reference category: rural)	
Town	**.29*****(.07)
Suburbs	**.52*****(.13)
Big City	**.77*****(.16)
Attend Services (reference category: never)	
Rarely	**-.47*****(.08)
At least once a week	**-.87****(.32)
Female	-.00(.04)
Age	-.00(.01)

Table 8b: Predicting Radical Right Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting)

Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Deservingness	**-.26*****(.06)
Welfare State	**.33*****(.08)
Income	.00(.04)
Subjective Economic Insecurity	**.41***(.16)
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	.18(.14)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	.19(.24)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	-.05(.23)
Advanced Vocational	**-.42***(.19)
Lower Tertiary	-.37(.42)
Higher Tertiary	-.69(.41)
Occupational Class (reference category: Technical Semi-Professional)	
Self-Employed Professionals & Large Employers	-.06(.15)
Small Business Owners	-.21(.28)
Production Workers	**.57****(.19)
Associate Managers	**-.26***(.10)
Clerks	-.34(.26)
Socio-Cultural Professionals	**-.68***(.27)
Service Workers	.40(.23)
Union	**.49*****(.08)
Urban (reference category: rural)	
Town	**.28*****(.07)
Suburbs	**.52*****(.13)
Big City	**.81*****(.15)
Attend Services (reference category: never)	
Rarely	**-.44*****(.06)
At least once a week	**-.82*****(.31)
Female	-.29(.16)
Age	-.00(.00)

Table 8c: Predicting Green Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting)

Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Deservingness	**.75*****(.08)
Welfare State	**.39*****(.07)
Income	-.01*(.04)
Subjective Economic Insecurity	**.25****(.08)
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	.88(.50)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	**.91***(.43)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	**1.49****(.49)
Advanced Vocational	**1.44****(.45)
Lower Tertiary	**1.64*****(.40)
Higher Tertiary	**1.59*****(.42)
Occupational Class (reference category: Technical Semi-Professional)	
Self-Employed Professionals & Large Employers	-.09(.51)
Small Business Owners	-.23(.45)
Production Workers	.12(.36)
Associate Managers	**-.59*****(.16)
Clerks	-.28(.16)
Socio-Cultural Professionals	.06(.15)
Service Workers	.08(.16)
Union	**.44****(.13)
Urban (reference category: rural)	
Town	**.49*****(.19)
Suburbs	**.47****(.14)
Big City	**.84*****(.29)
Attend Services (reference category: never)	
Rarely	**-.50*****(.06)
At least once a week	**-.74***(.34)
Female	**.47*****(.16)
Age	**-.02***(.01)

Table 8d: Predicting Radical Left Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting)

Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Deservingness	**.68*****(.04)
Welfare State	**.73*****(.06)
Income	-.06(.05)
Subjective Economic Insecurity	**.26***(.12)
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	.06(.17)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	-.29(.21)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	-.15(.18)
Advanced Vocational	-.31(.21)
Lower Tertiary	-.27(.25)
Higher Tertiary	-.20(.26)
Occupational Class (reference category: Technical Semi-Professional)	
Self-Employed Professionals & Large Employers	**-1.00****(.37)
Small Business Owners	-.26(.27)
Production Workers	.16(.17)
Associate Managers	**-.58*****(.16)
Clerks	-.53(.30)
Socio-Cultural Professionals	.05(.22)
Service Workers	.23(.21)
Union	**.84*****(.12)
Urban (reference category: rural)	
Town	.35(.23)
Suburbs	**.48****(.15)
Big City	**.91*****(.21)
Attend Services (reference category: never)	
Rarely	**-.98*****(.13)
At least once a week	**-1.84*****(.22)
Female	.04(.09)
Age	-.02(.01)

Table 8e: Predicting Liberal Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting)

Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Deservingness	.22(.13)
Welfare State	.14(.11)
Income	.03(.02)
Subjective Economic Insecurity	.03(.17)
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	.35(.35)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	.42(.23)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	.40(.28)
Advanced Vocational	.39(.29)
Lower Tertiary	**1.07****(.36)
Higher Tertiary	**1.26****(.46)
Occupational Class (reference category: Technical Semi-Professional)	
Self-Employed Professionals & Large Employers	-.46(.29)
Small Business Owners	-.35(.20)
Production Workers	-.10(.25)
Associate Managers	-.27(.16)
Clerks	-.18(.19)
Socio-Cultural Professionals	-.16(.22)
Service Workers	-.03(.21)
Union	**.37***(.15)
Urban (reference category: rural)	
Town	.15(.12)
Suburbs	.23(.25)
Big City	.30(.22)
Attend Services (reference category: never)	
Rarely	-.33(.08)
At least once a week	**-.74***(.30)
Female	.03(.19)
Age	-.00(.00)

N=12,105, R^2=.19. Note: Country Fixed Effects (Not Reported), SEs Clustered at Country-Level.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.

*

APPENDIX 1.3: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS, RESTRICTED COUNTRY SAMPLE

Countries differ in the constellation of parties which voters may choose between. As a robustness check to ensure this variation in choice sets is not biasing my results, I present below multinomial logistic regression results for the ten countries which contain all party families. These are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. I once again use the full battery of controls and country fixed effects. Since the results are substantively unchanged, however, I report here only the coefficients for the key independent variables of interest (*deservingness* and *welfare state*) across party families. Full results including controls are available from the author upon request.

Table 9: *Deservingness* and *Welfare State* Effects on Vote Choice, Restricted Country Sample

	Coefficient (S.E)	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Party Family	*Deservingness*	*Welfare State*
Conservative (Base Outcome)	N/A	N/A
Social Democratic	**.41*****(.05)	**.42*****(.08)
Radical Right	**-.24****(.08)	**.36****(.13)
Green	**.70*****(.07)	**.35*****(.08)
Radical Left	**.75*****(.05)	**.72*****(.07)
Liberal	.12(.11)	-.07(.10)

N=8,520, R^2=.18 Note: Country Fixed Effects (Not Reported), SEs Clustered At Country-Level. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.

APPENDIX 1.4: PREDICTING VOTING FOR TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE PARTIES, CONTROLLING FOR EU AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

Below are predicted probabilities for voting green and radical right across the range of *deservingness* and *welfare state* attitudes, controlling for EU and immigration attitudes and the original battery of controls. These are derived from multinomial logistic regression with voting conservative as the omitted base outcome, with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. As we see, positive *deservingness* perceptions remain strongly associated with a higher predicted probability of voting green and a lower predicted probability of voting radical right. This holds even controlling for potential confounding variables, including attitudes towards immigration and European integration.

Figure 11: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Green and Radical Right, Controlling for EU and Immigration Attitudes



APPENDIX 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Deviation
Deservingness	0	-2.80	2.87	1
Welfare State	0	-5.12	2.33	1
Education	3.95	1 (<Lower Secondary)	7 (Higher Tertiary)	1.91
Age	50.66	18	100	18.02
Female	.51	0	1	.5
Attend Services	.54	0 (Never)	2 (Weekly)	.72
Union	.40	0	1	.49
Rural/Urban	1.03	0 (Farm or country village)	3 (big city)	1.06
Immigration Attitudes	5.25	0	10	2.36
EU Attitudes	4.91	0	10	2.65
Econ_Strain	2.75	1 (Agree Strongly)	5 (Disagree Strongly)	1.04
Business_Strain	3.05	1 (Agree Strongly)	5 (Disagree Strongly)	1.05
Subjective Economic Insecurity	.30	0	1	.46

APPENDIX 2.2: CONSTRUCTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables *Deservingness* and *Welfare State* are constructed using principal component analysis (PCA), which forms a weighted scale based on latent dimensions found in the data. All variables beginning with "new" are reverse codings of the original ESS question, such that higher values indicate support for redistribution. The questions used to construct the two dependent variables are as follows:

Sblazy: "And to what extent to you agree/disagree that social/benefits and services make people lazy?"

1- Agree Strongly
2- Agree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Disagree Strongly

Bennent: "Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled"

1- Agree Strongly
2- Agree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Disagree Strongly

Sblwcoa: "And to what extent to you agree/disagree that social/benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another?"

1- Agree Strongly
2- Agree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Disagree Strongly

Uentrjb: "Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job"

1- Agree Strongly
2- Agree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Disagree Strongly

Newgincdif: "Government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"

1- Disagree Strongly
2- Disagree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Agree
5- Agree Strongly

Gvslvol*: "Should it be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?"

0- Should not be government's responsibility at all
.
.
.
10- Should be entirely government's responsibility

Gvslvue: "Should it be government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?"

0- Should not be government's responsibility at all
.
.
.
10- Should be entirely government's responsibility

Gvcldcr: "Should it be government's responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?"

0- Should not be government's responsibility at all
.
.
.
10- Should be entirely government's responsibility

Dfincac: "Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts"

1- Agree Strongly
2- Agree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Disagree Strongly

Newsmdfslv: "For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small."

1- Disagree Strongly
2- Disagree
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4- Agree
5- Agree Strongly

*

APPENDIX 2.3: ASSESSING EDUCATION EFFECTS ON *DESRVINGNESS* AND WELFARE STATE ATTITUDES, CONTROLLING FOR PARENTAL EDUCATION AND FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Since parental education and occupation are predictors of an individual's own educational attainment, there may be concerns that the effects of an individual's educational attainment on their redistribution attitudes may be spurious. To control for this, I operationalize parental education as the educational attainment of either the respondent's father or mother, whichever is highest. This uses the same ISCED measurement schema used to code individual educational attainment. Since occupational categories are not strictly ordinal, I am unable to take the highest parental occupation or average mother's and father's occupation; I thus operationalize parental occupation as father's occupation.

Table 11: Predicting Welfare State, Controlling for Parental Education and Father's Occupation

Independent Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	-.06 (.05)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	-.16* (.06)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	**.17*** (.06)
Advanced Vocational	**-.25** (.06)**
Lower Tertiary	**-.22***(.06)
Upper Tertiary	**-.28****(.09)
Parental Ed (ref.: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	-.03(.05)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	**-.11****(.04)**
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	-.05(.05)
Advanced Vocational	.04(.04)
Lower Tertiary	-.03(.06)
Upper Tertiary	-.06(.05)
Father's Occupation (ref.:Professional and Technical)	
Higher Administrator	**-.15****(.04)**
Clerical	.07(.06)
Sales	-.01(.06)
Service	-.02(.05)
Skilled Worker	.02(.04)
Semi-skilled Worker	.09(.05)
Unskilled Worker	**.11*(.04)**
Farm Worker	.00(.05)
Age	.00(.00)
Female	**.16*****(.03)**
Attend Services (ref.: never)	
Rarely	**-.10****(.03)
At least once/week	**-.15****(.04)
Union	**.21*****(.03)
Urban (ref: rural)	
Town	.06*(.02)
Suburbs	.02(.05)
Big City	**.16****(.05)
R^2	.15
N	19,887

*Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not reported), and country-clustered standard errors. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05*

Table 12: Predicting *Deservingness*, Controlling for Parental Education and Father's Occupation

Independent Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	.11(.09)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	-.02(.09)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	**.25***(.09)
Advanced Vocational	.23(.12)
Lower Tertiary	**.47****(.11)
Upper Tertiary	**.57****(.15)
Parental Ed (ref.: <Lower Sec.)	
Lower Secondary	-.03(.03)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	-.03(.05)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	-.04(.04)
Advanced Vocational	.01(.03)
Lower Tertiary	-.03(.06)
Upper Tertiary	-.07(.03)
Father's Occupation (ref.:Professional and Technical)	
Higher Administrator	**-.12*(.05)**
Clerical	-.10(.06)
Sales	**-.15*****(.02)
Service	**-.12****(.03)
Skilled Worker	**-.11***(.04)
Semi-skilled Worker	**-.13***(.06)
Unskilled Worker	-.07(.05)
Farm Worker	**-.13***(.04)
Age	.00(.00)
Female	.01(.02)
Attend Services (ref.: never)	
Rarely	**-.09***(.03)
At least once/week	**-.11****(.05)
Union	**.13*****(.05)
Urban (ref: rural)	
Town	.03(.03)
Suburbs	**.13*****(.03)
Big City	**.22*****(.02)
R^2	.11
N	19,887

*Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not reported), and country-clustered standard errors. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05*

APPENDIX 2.4: ASSESSING EDUCATION EFFECTS ON *WELFARE STATE* ATTITUDES, CONTROLLING FOR RISK AND VALUES

In Table 13, one model adds controls for economic risk, and the other for the anti-redistributive values theorized by some scholars to be imparted through socialization in university—namely, that the inefficiency of redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses (Gelepithis and Giani 2020: 11). The socialization model controls for the belief that social benefits and services place too great a strain on business and on the economy generally. These are operationalized in *Business_Strain* and *Econ_Strain*, variables ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with the statements "social benefits and services cost businesses too much in taxes" and "social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy", respectively. Strongly Agree is used as the reference category for both variables. Those controls do not weaken the relationship between education and welfare state attitudes, notably including at the lower and higher tertiary levels.

Subjective economic insecurity is a binary measure assigning respondents a 1 if they report being either a) somewhat or very worried about losing their job or b) having a difficult or very difficult time coping on their income, and a 0 if they do not report either job or financial insecurity. I find that negative education effects on welfare state attitudes are weakened by about a quarter when controlling for subjective economic insecurity, but still remain statistically and substantively significant. This is not a definitive test, but offers some evidence that economic risk is an important operative mechanism linking education to *welfare state* opposition.

Table 13: Predicting Welfare State, Controlling for Anti-Redistributive Values and Subjective Economic Risk

	Model 1 (Incl. Values)	**Model 2 (Risk)**
Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)		
Lower Secondary	**-.07****(.02)	-.05(.04)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	**-.16****(.04)	-.12(.06)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	**-.22*****(.03)	**-.11***(.05)
Advanced Vocational	**-.31*****(.03)	**-.21*****(.04)
Lower Tertiary	**-.32*****(.04)	**-.20****(.05)
Upper Tertiary	**-.41*****(.05)	**-.25*****(.04)
Econ_Strain (ref: Strongly Agree)		
Agree	.02(.06)	
Neither agree nor disagree	.08(.08)	
Disagree	**.24***(.10)	
Strongly disagree	**.55*****(.07)	
Business_Strain (ref: Strongly Agree)		
Agree	.05(.06)	
Neither agree nor disagree	.09(.06)	
Disagree	**.25****(.08)	
Strongly disagree	**.57*****(.08)	
Subjective Economic Insecurity		**.21*****(.04)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Female	**.14*****(.03)	**.14*****(.03)
Attend Services (ref.: never)		
Rarely	**-.06***(.02)	**-.11*****(.02)
At least once/week	**-.11****(.03)	**-.15****(.04)
Union	**.16*****(.01)	**.22*****(.02)
Urban (ref: rural)		
Town	.03(.02)	.04(.02)
Suburbs	.00(.04)	.01(.05)
Big City	.09(.04)	**.14***(.05)
R^2	.19	.15
N	23, 386	20,532

*Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not reported), and country-clustered standard errors. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05*

APPENDIX 2.5: REANALYZING THE *WELFARE STATE* MEASURE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT VS. SOCIAL CONSUMPTION

Table 14 decomposes the *welfare state* dimension to test whether education effects differ according to policy areas related to social consumption and social investment. The first two dependent variables register support for social consumption: support for government responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for the elderly, and for the unemployed. The third is a key policy domain of social investment: government responsibility to provide child care services for working parents. All three variables range from "not government's responsibility at all" (0) to "entirely government's responsibility" (10).

Education effects are not monotonic in every case, and certain educational categories are not statistically significant, as with the effect of an upper tertiary education on supporting government responsibility for the unemployed, or the effect of a lower tertiary education on government responsibility for childcare. This may be due partly to the fact that responses to individual survey items are generally less reliable than multi-item scales (Ansolabehere *et al*. 2008).

That said, the overall pattern is consistent with the main results of the paper with respect to *welfare state*: education is negatively associated with support for government responsibility over social policy. Notably, this pattern is consistent across social consumption policy domains as well as social investment policy domains. The strongest negative education effect on support for government responsibility in childcare, for example, is found for tertiary education.

The literature on social support coalitions for social investment and social consumption finds that the less educated support passive consumption policy, while the highly educated support active social investment policy (e.g. Häusermann *et al.* 2012; Garritzmann et al. 2018). The

findings of this Appendix should not be overinterpreted as a challenge to this literature. This work generally centers around *priorities* for different types of social spending under conditions of fiscal constraint, rather than support for state responsibility over social policy areas in the abstract. For the purposes of this paper, however, this evidence suggests that the negative effect of education on *welfare state* support is consistent across policy domains.

Table 14: Decomposing the *Welfare State* Dimension

	DV 1: Gov't Responsibility for Elderly's Std. of Living	**DV 2: Gov't Responsibility for Unemployed Std. of Living**	**DV 3: Gov't Responsibility for Childcare**
Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.E)**	**Coefficient (S.E)**	**Coefficient (S.E)**
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)			
Lower Secondary	**-.12****(.03)	-.14(.08)	**-.21****(.06)
Lower Tier Upper Secondary	**-.18***(.08)	**-.48*****(.09)	**-.18***(.08)
Upper Tier Upper Secondary	**-.29*****(.05)	**-.26****(.06)	**-.26***(.09)
Advanced Vocational	**-.36*****(.06)	**-.41****(.10)	**-.27***(.09)
Lower Tertiary	**-.38*****(.04)	**-.25****(.07)	-.22(.12)
Upper Tertiary	**-.62*****(.11)	-.23(.11)	**-.28***(.11)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	**-.01***(.00)
Female	**.08***(.03)	**.14*****(.03)	**.25*****(.05)
Attend Services (ref.: never)			
Rarely	**-.06***(.02)	**-.11*****(.02)	-.05(.03)
At least once/week	**-.11****(.03)	**-.15****(.04)	**-.25*****(.05)
Union	**.23*****(.04)	**.22*****(.02)	**.24*****(.05)
Urban (ref: rural)			
Town	.04(.04)	.04(.02)	.10(.08)
Suburbs	-.03(.09)	.01(.05)	.08(.09)
Big City	.12(.08)	**.14***(.05)	**.18*****(.04)
R^2	.06	.15	.10
N	27, 006	20,532	26,836

*Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not reported), and country-clustered standard errors. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05*

APPENDIX 2.6: CALCULATING INDIRECT EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON VOTE CHOICE VIA *DESERVINGNESS* AND *WELFARE STATE* ATTITUDES, CONTROLLING FOR IMMIGRATION AND EU ATTITUDES

Immigration and EU attitudes are often seen as paramount to the educational divide in electoral politics. Since both types of attitudes can result causally from education, adding them as controls risks creating post-treatment bias. However, with this in mind, a robustness check controlling for these attitudes can allay concerns around omitted variable bias. The resulting test should be considered a conservative one; rather than trying to generate a precise estimate of education effects, this test gives us a sense of the effect of education on vote choice via *deservingness* and *welfare state*, after controlling for socio-cultural attitudes.

Here *immigration attitudes* is operationalized with a measure which asks respondents on a 0-10 scale whether they think immigrants are bad (0) or good (10) for their country. *EU Attitudes* are operationalized with a measure which asks respondents on a 0-10 scale whether they think European unification has gone too far (0) or not far enough (10). Tables 15 and 16 repeat the kappa mediation analyses to test the robustness of indirect effects of education on vote choice via *deservingness* and *welfare state*, controlling for immigration and EU attitudes. Table 15 shows that the core finding of the paper's earlier mediation analysis is robust to the inclusion of controls for EU and immigration attitudes; a substantial portion of the effects of education on voting for green and radical right parties is indirect via *deservingness* perceptions. In Table 16, we also see that, controlling for EU and immigration attitudes, indirect effects of education on vote choice appear for social democratic and liberal parties.

In the case of social democratic, radical left, and conservative parties, the direct effects of education on voting sometimes paradoxically appear somewhat bigger than the total effects of

education on voting, depending on the attitudinal control. In part, this is likely because the kappa estimates have some level of statistical uncertainty, and the total education effects for these parties are weak.

It is also possible that there is a suppression effect;[34] since education is correlated with immigration attitudes, the initial logistic regression predicting voting (before introducing attitudes) could be understating the effect of education. This would explain why the direct education effect estimated after controlling for immigration attitudes would appear stronger than the total education effect.

Table 15: Direct & Indirect Effects of Education on Voting (via *Deservingness*), Controlling for Immigration and EU Attitudes

Family	Total Effect of Education on Vote	Direct Effect of Education on Vote	Indirect Effect of Education on Vote (via *Deservingness)*
Conservatives	.122	.167	-.045
Social Democrats	.218	.244	-.026
Radical Right	.350	.311	.039
Greens	.427	.346	.081
Radical Left	.085	.154	-.069
Liberals	.427	.451	-.024

[34] Correspondence with Peter E. Langsaether, May 2020.

Table 16: Direct & Indirect Effects of Education on Voting (via *Welfare State*), Controlling for Immigration and EU Attitudes

Family	Total Effect of Education on Vote	Direct Effect of Education on Vote	Indirect Effect of Education on Vote (via *Deservingness)*
Conservatives	.122	.096	.026
Social Democrats	.218	.175	.043
Radical Right	.350	.348	.002
Greens	.427	.448	-.021
Radical Left	.085	.085	.000
Liberals	.427	.396	.030

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